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The youth of France refer to themselves as the "throwaway generation,"
in part because they perceive that their value to the labor market is simply
disregarded by the government. Against this backdrop, young French
workers recently took to the streets in riot to protest a newly enacted
employment law that stripped employees under the age of twenty-six of
many of their employment protections. The protests persisted after the
French Constitutional Council held that the law did not violate France's
constitution. The continued violent opposition ultimately forced French
President Jacques Chirac to abandon the law, resulting in an embarrassing
defeat for the government. Through unified action, French students,
accompanied by union support, had forced the government to back away
from a law that the youth perceived would limit their employment rights.
In the United States, Congress has passed similar legislation affording
greater employment protections to older workers. The U.S. Supreme Court
has also recently acted in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,' to
make clear that protection from age discrimination in employment was
intended for older, rather than younger, employees. Even more recently, in
Smith v. City of Jackson,2 the Court further restricted the employment
protections of all employees on the basis of age. In response to this
legislation and these Court decisions limiting their employment rights,
however, American youth have remained silent-their complacency
standing in stark contrast to the reaction of French youth. By failing to act,

t
Mr. Seiner is an adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center
where he teaches a course about domestic and international perspectives on employment
discrimination. Mr. Seiner is also an attorney with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
views of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or of the United States. The
author recognizes the significant efforts of Benjamin Gutman, Daniel Vail, and his loving wife
Megan in the development of this article. Finally, the author would like to dedicate this article
to the memory of Dr. John E. Sweeney (1934-2006), whose generous assistance in the
translation of complex French legal text proved instrumental to the development of this topic.
Dr. Sweeney was a friend and a true scholar, and he will be missed.
1. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
2.
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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young American workers have permitted the erosion of their employment
rights.
This article examines the structure and social context of employment law
in France and the United States in an effort to explain the disparate reaction
of the youth to similar labor laws and court decisions. The article provides a
detailed analysis of relevant age-related legislation in each country, and
examines the reasoning behind the recent French Constitutional Council and
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The article concludes that the different
reactions of youth in France and the United States can be explained by three
factors: (1) the varying unemployment rates between the two countries; (2)
the different role that unions play in France and the United States; and (3)
the fact that the French government, as opposed to the United States
government, has a recent history of acquiescing to the demands of youth.
The article proposes that by finding a collective voice, American youththrough peaceful means-can act to ensure that their employment
protections are not limited any further. Ambivalence is simply not an
answer.
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France was racked by strikes and demonstrations that turned
violent on Tuesday, the latest act in a nationwide political and
social drama aimed at forcing the government to rescind a new
youth labor law.
The worst violence occurred in the heart of Paris, as the
demonstrations were winding down and groups of youths
confronted the riot police. One police officer was reported
seriously injured when a largefirecracker thrown by protesters
exploded in his face. The police eventually turned to tear gas and
water cannons to clearthe protestersaway.3
I.

INTRODUCTION

The "Kleenex generation."4 This is how French youth perceive their role
in society because they believe that their talents are "used and tossed
aside."5 In the spring of 2006, the frustrations of this generation spilled over
into a series of violent protests that will forever change the social structure
of France.
On March 28, 2006, an estimated 2.7 million protesters took to the
streets of France to challenge a recently enacted employment law that
permitted the discharge of employees under the age of twenty-six without
cause if the termination occurred within two years of the worker's start
3.
Elaine Sciolino & Craig S. Smith, Protests in France over Youth Labor Law Turn
Violent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A12.
4.
See, e.g., Brian Duffy, Is Paris Burning? Yep-for All the Wrong Reasons, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Apr. 3, 2006, at 14.

5.

Id.
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date. 6 The protests turned intense, as many youths hurled rocks and bottles
at police, who responded by charging the more aggressive groups.7 The
demonstrations widely interfered with France's transit operations, causing
disruptions to air, bus, and train travel across the country.8 The strikers also
caused the shut down of the Eiffel Tower and Paris Opera. 9 The riots sent
shockwaves throughout the French government, as legislators from many
parties "warned that the size of the protests signaled a threat to the future of
the government."' Two days later, in a historic decision, the French
Constitutional Council upheld the constitutionality of the newly enacted
law." The Council determined that it would not second guess Parliament on
the terms of the law, which, on its face, had the goal of attempting to help
younger workers secure employment. 2 The decision further embroiled the
tensions between French youth and the government, as widespread protests
continued. 3

One day after the Constitutional Council's ruling, French President
Jacques Chirac attempted to compromise with the protesters, promising to
limit the "trial period" in the law to one year and require that discharged
employees be given the reason for their termination. 14 The compromise
offer was met with renewed protests as "several thousand young people"
took to the streets and were confronted by police who resorted to using tear
gas. 5 On April 2, 2006, Chirac signed the so-called "first job contract" into
law. 16 France's union syndicates responded immediately by planning more
demonstrations. 1 7 Finally, on April 10, 2006, Chirac announced that the
labor law would be rescinded, a move that "was a humiliating political
6.
Molly Moore, Huge Protest Puts France to the Test, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at
A13; Sciolino & Smith, supra note 3.
7.
Sciolino & Smith, supra note 3.
8.
Moore, supra note 6. "An estimated one-third of all flights to and from Paris airports
Id.
I.."
were canceled and most others were delayed .
Id.
9.
10. Id.
http://www.conseilMar.
30,
2006,
decision
no.
2006-535DC,
11. CC
constitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf; see also Molly Moore, Protesters
Urge Chiracto Relent on Jobs Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006.
12. See infra Part III (discussing the Constitutional Council's decision upholding the
constitutionality of the youth employment law).
13. See Craig S. Smith, French Law Is Affirmed as Protests Snarl Traffic, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2006, at A4.
14. Craig S. Smith, Chirac Offers Labor Law Compromise; Protesters Reject It, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A3.
15. Id.
16. Craig S. Smith, ChiracSigns Jobs Bill; More ProtestsAre Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2006, at A8.
17. Id.
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defeat" for Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. 8 Villepin,
who drafted the law and who is a presidential hopeful in the country's
upcoming elections, may have seen his political hopes "crippled and
possibly killed" by the protests and the government's willingness to bow to
the youth groups.' 9 The irony of Chirac and Villepin's political debacle is
that the law was actually designed to help cure the prevalent problem of
high unemployment among French youth, which stands at about twenty-two
percent.20 The belief was that the law would give employers increased
flexibility in handling its younger employees and therefore lead to an
increased desire to hire these younger workers. 2 ' Obviously, the French
youth did not see the benefit in this law, viewing it simply as a way to strip
them of their employment protections.22 In its place, Chirac has introduced a
less sweeping proposal, offering "financial incentives" to employers for
hiring and training younger employees, and providing assistance to youth in
finding jobs and internships.23
In the United States, it is hard to imagine a labor law in recent times that
has generated such widespread debate and violence. Indeed, one would
likely have to go back to the civil rights movement of the early sixties to
find an example that would rival the recent French debate. In response to
oppression and lack of opportunities, there was large-scale rioting in the

18. Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law that Caused Wide French Riots, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at Al. Chirac's weakened position in implementing employment policies
is further demonstrated by his recent attempt to persuade French employees to work during a
traditional holiday to raise money for older persons and the disabled. See Colin Randall, French
Stay Home to Snub Chirac's "Day of Solidarity," DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 6, 2006, at
16. Over half of the workers in the country stayed home during Whit Monday, rejecting the
government's attempt to abolish the holiday. Id.
19. Molly Moore, Protests Force French Premier to Dump Youth Jobs Law: Villepin
Championed Measure that "Was Not Understood," WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2006, at A14; see
also Alessandra Galloni, Split Vote, Protests Reveal Discontent in Europe; Bowing to Popular
Pressure, French PresidentAbandons a New Youth-Labor Law, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2006, at
A3. Indeed, a poll taken in March 2006, placed Villepin's approval rating at twenty-nine
percent. See Smith, supra note 13.
20. See Galloni, supra note 19; see also Andrew Higgins, Liberte, Precarite:Labor Law
Ignites Anxiety in France, WALL ST.J., Mar. 29, 2006, at A l ("The uproar began as a protest
against a new law designed to relax a rigid French labor market that makes it difficult to fire
anyone.").
21. See Moore, supra note 19 ("This deregulation would help prime the economy and
ultimately expand the job market, proponents argued.").
22. See Smith, supra note 14 ("The effort [to reduce youth unemployment] was lost on
university students, who saw the law as an invitation for employers to further exploit the
country's job-hungry young people.").
23. See Sciolino, supra note 18.
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early sixties by blacks in the streets of many American cities.24 The
demonstrations often turned bloody and resulted in the burning and looting
of white-owned establishments. One of the positive results to arise from
the rioting was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which gave
protections to all American workers from discrimination on the basis of race
and color.26

In recent times, there have been no similar widespread protests in the
United States by American youth. Like their French counterparts, young
American workers have watched as greater protections have been given to
older workers. Indeed, the passage of age legislation and two recent
Supreme Court decisions highlight the erosion of the rights of younger
workers in this country. When it passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967,27 Congress contemplated extending employment
protections to younger workers, but decided against protecting this group as
it would undermine the "major objective of the bill., 28 More recently, in
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,29 the U.S. Supreme Court

made clear that protection from age discrimination in employment was
24. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 689 (2004)
(acknowledging the violence that occurred during the civil rights movement and noting that
some protests would result in "huge, bloody riots, most often in black neighborhoods," as
protesters "burned and looted stores owned by whites and fought with local police").
25. Id. It was often unclear who led or participated in these riots, as black leaders clearly
opposed them. See, e.g., Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Neither Liberty nor Justice: Anti-Gay
Initiatives, PoliticalParticipation,and the Rule of Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.POL'y 431, 432
(1996) ("Martin Luther King preached nonviolent opposition to the racist power structure and
led civil rights marches to protest the inequality between black and white Americans." (quoting
Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551,
1580 (1993))). Even the black protesters themselves were not safe from violence, and were
attacked by those with opposing views. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered
Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and
Environmentalism Has to Teach Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 323 (2001)
(discussing "white backlash" of civil rights movement and noting that "[d]uring a march
through an all-white neighborhood in Chicago, a group led by Jesse Jackson was attacked by a
mob carrying signs of 'White Power"').
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....");
see Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the March
Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, II TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) ("[T]he
violent response that followed a peaceful civil rights demonstration ...may have ...convinced
President Kennedy to implore Congress to pass a comprehensive civil rights legislation.").
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
28. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 7 (1967), as reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
29. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
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intended for older, rather than younger, employees. 30 And, subsequent to
Cline, the Supreme Court has acted to further restrict the employment
protections of all employees on the basis of age.31
What has been the reaction of American youth to Supreme Court
decisions restricting their rights and legislation granting far greater
protections to older workers? Ambivalence. While their French counterparts
were active in pressing their unions to fight legislation that stripped them of
their rights, American youth have not attempted any similar protest of agerelated laws or decisions. While it is unclear whether active opposition
would have had any effect on the law, one thing is certain-continued
passivity by American youth will lead to further employment rights being
stripped away from this group. While violence and rioting are certainly not
the answers, peaceful opposition to existing and proposed legislation could
yield beneficial results.
So the obvious question is-why would the youth in France feel such
widespread animosity towards a labor law restricting their rights while
American youth allow their protections to be taken away without interest or
reaction? This article attempts to answer that question by examining the
cultural context of age-related legislation and high court decisions in both
countries. By understanding the history of the youth movements in France
and the United States, as well as the legal rationale for age-related
legislation and critical court decisions in both countries, we can make sense
of the disparate reactions of the younger workers. With this understanding,
American youth can act to shed their indifference and take action through a
collective voice in response to any future political or judicial action eroding
their (already severely restricted) employment protections.
This article begins this analysis by examining the structure of French
employment law, with a particular emphasis on the protections against age
discrimination as well as France's role in the European Union. The article
then examines the French Constitutional Council's decision upholding the
constitutionality of the recently proposed youth labor law. The article
further examines the reaction of French youth to the law, explaining how
the social culture in the country resulted in widespread protests. The article
then compares the structure of American employment law to that in France,
focusing on the passage of the U.S. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, as well as recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions further eroding the
employment protections of younger workers. The article continues with an
examination of why American youth have not reacted to this legislation or
30.
31.

Id. at 590-92.
See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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the Supreme Court decisions-explaining that the low unemployment rate
in this country, the lack of union support for younger workers, and the lack
of a history of successful protests in the United States have fostered a
culture of indifference among American youth. Finally, this article proposes
that young American workers must learn from French youth and find a
collective voice to prevent their employment rights from being eviscerated
altogether.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF FRENCH EMPLOYMENT LAW

To fully understand the emotional reaction of French youth to the "First
Job Contract" restricting the rights of younger workers, a discussion of the
structure of French labor law is necessary. Compared to the United States,
France enjoys widespread worker benefits and employment protections.32
Indeed, French workers are entitled by law to five weeks of compensated
leave, receive mandatory profit-sharing, and work only thirty-five hours in
the standard week.33 France also has an extensive social security system of
which employers shoulder a heavy burden.34 These benefits and protections
"reflect the prevailing social-democratic political ideology. 3 5 Importantly,
unlike American law where an employee can be terminated for any
nondiscriminatory reason, employees in France enjoy what is known as
"just cause dismissal. 36 This system provides employees with protections
from termination far greater than any protections found in the United States,
32. 1 INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 3-1 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003). But see BRICE DICKSON,
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 186 (1994) (noting that "[t]here is a remarkable similarity
between the [French and English] legal systems" in the area of employment law).
33. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32. As of July 1, 2004, the minimum wage in
France was 7.61 euros per hour. Id. at 3-9 (Supp. 2005); see also Michael K. Edmonson, Note,
A Tale of Two Appellations: A Comparative Study of InternationalAgreements and Prevailing
Law Impacting the Availability of Seasonal Employees for the Wine-Grape Harvest in
California'sNapa Valley and France'sBordeaux Appellation, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547,
563-64 (2003) ("[T]he [French Labor] code ... specifies a standard workweek of thirty-five
hours, and requires that additional compensation shall be paid to employees for hours worked
beyond that standard.").
34. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32.
35. Id.; see also Antoine Vivant, France,in EU & INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 1, 9
(Viv Du Feu et al. eds., 2001) ("France has developed an abundant and complex set of laws for
the protection of the employee, making France the 'social laboratory' of Europe.").
36. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-2; see Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking
Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1443, 1514 n.413 (1996) ("In France, the just cause requirement requires the judges to
find the actual existence of the alleged fact which constituted cause for dismissal as well as the
fact that the cause alleged is the true reason for the dismissal at the time of the dismissal.").
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of the union setting. 37 These protections attach after an initial "trial
between the employer and employee, which typically lasts about
three months.38 After the trial period, the employment contract
into between the parties "becomes definite" and the worker "can
dismissed for cause or for economic reasons. 39
A. Terminationfor Just Cause and Union Protections

France's requirement that termination must be for "just cause" is derived
from the concept that "one of the foremost objectives" of employment law
in the country is guaranteeing "security of employment. ' 40 Under the "just
cause" system, an employer in France must provide a legitimate reason for
an employee's termination, giving the employee "procedural and
substantive due process."'4' Thus, dismissal must be based on a "genuine
and serious" rationale, and the rationale must be provided in writing if
requested by the employee.42 The employer's reason for the termination
37. See generally Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American
Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971) (providing a comparative look between American
labor protections and the laws of other countries).
38. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-9 (noting that while the trial period, or
piriode d'essai, is in effect, "the employee can be dismissed without formalities or particular
reasons"); FRANCIS LEFEBVRE, FRANCE: LEGAL AND TAX GUIDE 326 (1992) (discussing the trial
period and noting that either the employer or employee can end the employment relationship "at
any moment without notice or indemnities"). Indeed, the typical French worker also has
protections from being disciplined; there is a "two-phase procedure" which must be followed
under the Labor Code to sanction a worker, including an interview and "official notification."
LEFEBVRE, supra, at 344-45. The employee may further appeal the disciplinary action to a labor
tribunal, which is a bipartisan body which has the authority to quash the discipline. Id. at 346.
39. LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 317.
40. MICHEL DESPAX & JACQUES ROJOT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
FRANCE 109 (1987).
41. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-2; see also LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at
335-36 (defining "real and serious cause" under the statute and case law); Erin E. Bahn, Note,
To Labor in the Dancing World: Human Rights at Work, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS.L. REV. 105, 127
(2001) (Employment law in France "has been subject to a special regulatory regime dating back
to 1975 and is defined according to two essential criteria: the reason for dismissal must not
relate to the individual concerned (licenciement pour motif individuel) and the termination must
derive from the abolition or alteration of the job or from a refusal to accept a substantive change
to the contract of employment." (quoting ANTOINE LYON-CAEN, EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GLOSSARY: FRANCE 478 (1993))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Karen Paull, Note, Employment Termination Reform: What Should a Statute Require
Before Termination?-Lessons from the French, British, and German Experiences, 14
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 619, 656-57 (1991) ("The labor tribunals and the reviewing
courts have interpreted 'genuine' in a manner that is fairly deferential to managerial judgment,
but 'serious' has been interpreted to mean that employers' actions must be evaluated in light of
principles of progressive discipline."); see LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 335-39 (discussing what
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must relate to "an established, objective, exact and sufficiently serious
reason" that is based on the employee's poor behavior or "aptitude," or on a
justified business necessity.43 Case law interpreting what would establish a
genuine or serious reason for termination has found that excessive tardiness,
threatening behavior, lack of qualifications, insubordination, disloyalty, and
drug use on the job all warrant an employee's discharge.' Economic
reasons can also justify an employee's discharge for "redundancy," though
this involves a separate inquiry into the employer's financial status.45 The
cases have rejected, however, an employer's attempt to terminate an
employee based on age, illness, unrelated criminal convictions, union
activity, or personal life.46

The employee is also entitled to a hearing prior to termination to listen to
the employer's rationale and may respond with any concerns.4 7 Indeed, the
dismissal process itself is quite complex. Initially, an employer must contact
an employee within two months of learning of the reason that forms the
basis of the termination, propose a meeting date, and inform the worker that
he is entitled to representation.48 At the meeting, the employer should
clearly set forth the reason for the dismissal, and provide the employee with
an opportunity to explain why the termination is unjust.4 9 If the employer
constitutes "real and serious cause" under the French Labor Code and case law, and setting forth
the dismissal process under French law).
43. Vivant, supra note 35, at 95; see LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 335 ("Real and serious
cause may be based on the fact that an individual is not performing up to standards, provided
that such lack of adequate performance is provable with factual circumstances.").
44. Vivant, supra note 35, at 95-96; see also INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at
3-10 (noting that under existing court precedent discharge is proper for incompetence, inability
to meet quotas, professional shortcomings, lack of trustworthiness, and sexual harassment). See
generally DICKSON, supra note 32, at 200-01 (setting forth dismissal process in France).
45. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-47 to -48. Discharge for economic
purposes is codified by statute, and the "mere aim of cutting expenses in a healthy company
would not be a justified reason for a redundancy." Id. at 3-48. There is also a separate process
for effectuating a reduction in force. Id. at 3-48 to -55; see also Bruce D. Fisher & Francois
Lenglart, Employee Reductions in Force: A Comparative Study of French and U.S. Legal
Protectionsfor Employees Downsized Out of Their Jobs: A Suggested Alternative to Workforce
Reductions, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 181, 200-03 (2003) (discussing recent
revisions to economic downsizing law in France).
46. Vivant, supra note 35, at 96; see also LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 335-36 ("The
courts have held that a vague assertion that an employee chronically failed to work energetically
is insufficient justification for a dismissal.").
47. Paull, supra note 42, at 657; see DESPAX & ROJOT, supra note 40, at 115-16
(discussing procedural requirements of hearing prior to employee termination); LEFEBVRE,
supra note 38, at 336-37 (discussing the conciliation process and pre-termination meeting).
48. Vivant, supra note 35, at 96-97; see also LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 336 (setting
forth requirements of the "convocation letter").
49. LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 336-37 (discussing requirements of the "pre-dismissal
meeting"); Vivant, supra note 35, at 97.
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decides to proceed with the discharge, he must inform the employee of the
decision within thirty days by registered mail, "clearly and precisely"
setting forth its justification. ° Should the matter proceed to litigation, the
employer is restricted to using only the rationale set forth in the dismissal
letter as the true rationale for the termination.5 An employee who is
dismissed is entitled to considerable severance benefits under French law,
even if the termination is for just cause.52 These benefits include payment of
at least "one-tenth of a month's salary for each year of service," with
additional compensation given to workers with more than ten years of
service.53 The Labor Courts, which consist of equal numbers of employee
and employer representatives, attempt to conciliate and, if unsuccessful,
oversee hearings of individual employment contract disputes.54 If the
dispute is over more than a requisite amount of money, the court's decision
can be appealed.55
Additionally, the power of labor unions in France is far more significant
than in the United States.56 Indeed, unlike the United States, the French
Constitution actually grants "the freedom to form unions and the right to
strike" as basic rights to all individuals.57 Unions represent employees in
negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and can strike over issues
50. Vivant, supra note 35, at 97; see INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-11 to 12 (discussing procedural requirements of dismissal notice); LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 337
(noting requirement that employer must set forth reasons for termination in letter).
51. Vivant, supra note 35, at 97; see LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 337 ("The reasons
indicated in the dismissal letter have substantial significance for any subsequent appeal.").
52. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-2; Vivant, supra note 35, at 98. An
exception exists for employees who are terminated for "gross misconduct." Id.
53. Vivant, supra note 35, at 98; see INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-13
("Indemnities are due in cases of dismissal for personal reasons or dismissal arising from a
reduction in the work force. They are not due when the employee is terminated for gross
negligence or willful misconduct."); LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 337-38 (discussing employer
indemnity obligations under French law).
54. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-15.
55. Id. at 3-15 to -16.
56. Cf DICKSON, supra note 32, at 190-91 ("To a greater extent than in English law, the
[collective bargaining] agreement constitutes a source of law in France and it binds not just
members of the union or unions party to the agreement, but also members of other unions in the
same workforce and employees who are not members of any union."); Vivant, supra note 35, at
9 ("One of the main features of French employment law is the supremacy of collective
bargaining agreements over other sources of employment law which ostensibly organise work
relations."); infra Part VII.B (discussing relative power of French labor unions).
57. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-19 to -20 (citing the 1958 French
Constitution and the Preamble to 1946 French Constitution); see also DICKSON, supra note 32,
at 189 ("[T]he Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, incorporated by reference into the
Constitution of 1958, states that every person can defend his or her rights and interests by trade
union activity and can belong to the trade union of his or her choice."); LEFEBVRE, supra note
38, at 358-59 (discussing employee union rights under law).
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related to "general salary level, health and safety measures, or violations of
union rights."58 Any collective disputes, such as allegations of an improper
strike, are outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Courts and must therefore be
brought as a civil dispute.59
Employers in France are also restricted from discriminating against
individuals either in the hiring process or in making employment
decisions. 60 Discrimination claims can be brought in either the criminal or
civil court system.6 . Unlike the United States, employers that violate the
anti-discrimination laws in France can be subject to criminal, rather than
civil, penalties.62 Indeed, the French Penal Code expressly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of "origin, sex, family situation, state of health,
handicap, customs, political opinions, trade union membership or belonging63
or non-belonging, real or supposed ethnic group, race or religion.,
Because criminal penalties (including imprisonment) are involved,
employment discrimination claims under the French Penal Code require a
showing of intent and are often difficult to prove. 64 Similar to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States, 65 Article 122-45 of the
58. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-33; see LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at
365-67 (discussing collective bargaining, a union's right to strike, and the rare use of "lockouts" under French law).
59.
INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-37.
60. Vivant, supra note 35, at 63; see LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 319-20 (setting forth
classes protected from discrimination in the hiring process).
61. Vivant, supra note 35, at 64C (discussing differences between criminal and civil court
systems as related to employment discrimination claims).
62. Id. ("All discrimination-based claims are criminal offences and must therefore be
prosecuted within the criminal court system."); Donna M. Gitter, Comment, French
Criminalization of Racial Employment Discrimination Compared to the Imposition of Civil
Penalties in the United States, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 488, 505 (1994) ("Perhaps the most
significant difference between French and U.S. methods of dealing with employment
discrimination is that France treats [the] problem as a crime while the United States imposes
civil penalties to redress this type of prejudice in the workplace.").
63. Vivant, supra note 35, at 63 (citing Articles 225-1 and 225-2 of the French Penal
Code); see DICKSON, supra note 32, at 192 ("It is fair to say that today discrimination ... is
contrary to French ordre public and the new Code pgnal is quite explicit in its condemnation of
such practices."). Interestingly, France also recently extended its employment protections to
prohibit psychological harassment against employees. See Rachel A. Yuen, Note, Beyond the
Schoolyard: Workplace Bullying and Moral Harassment Law in France and Quebec, 38
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 635 (2005) (setting forth the elements of a psychological harassment
claim in France).
64. See Vivant, supra note 35, at 63 (noting high burden of proof to establish criminal
conviction on employment discrimination claim); Gitter, supra note 62, at 506 (arguing that one
of the downsides of criminalizing discrimination "is the high standard of proof necessary to
sustain a criminal conviction"); see also id. (citing Articles 225-1 and 225-2 of the French Penal
Code that set forth prohibitions on discrimination on various protected grounds).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (2000).

38:1053]

UNDERSTANDING FRANCE'S UNREST

1065

Labor Code (or Code du travail) also widely prohibits discrimination in
France, and provides that:
No person may be excluded from a recruiting procedure, or
from a traineeship or from professional training within an
undertaking and no employee may be sanctioned or dismissed [...]
because of his ethnic origin, gender, moral or sexual orientation,
age, family status, genetic makeup, real or supposed race, [...],
political opinions, union-related or mutualist activities, religious or
political beliefs, physical appearance, patronym, health conditions
or disability, except for physical inaptitude established by a
medical doctor.66
The Code du travail also provides a worker who has been discriminated
against with the opportunity for monetary compensation.67
B. Discriminationon the Basis ofAge
Until recently, French employment law did not contemplate
discrimination on the basis of age. 68 The Labor Code did state, however,
that "all clauses providing for the automatic termination of an employment
contract on the ground of the employee's age" are void. 69 Age
discrimination is not often set forth by an employer under the terms of the
contract, and must be inferred through the employer's actions-thus making
such a provision ineffectual in addressing more subtle forms of age
discrimination. The European Union (EU), however, of which France is a
member, issued directive 2000/78/EC requiring that all member states
implement legislation prohibiting certain forms of discrimination, including
age discrimination. 7 °

66. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L122-45 (Fr.), translatedin GEORGE BERMANN &
PIERRE KIRCH, FRENCH BusINEss LAW IN TRANSLATION IX-18 (2005); see Vivant, supra note
35, at 63.
67. Gitter, supra note 62, at 511 n. 129 ("France's only code provision which could be read
to provide explicitly for pecuniary compensation to an employment discrimination victim is L.
122-8 of the Labor Code .... ).
68. Vivant, supra note 35, at 64B ("Age discrimination is hardly envisaged by the law.").
69. Id.; see also LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 332-33 (discussing retirement process in
France and noting that the "mandatory retirement" is no longer valid under the Labor Code).
70. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC); see Vivant, supra note 35, at
64B ("[B]y 2006 France will have anti-age discrimination legislation when it implements the
EC Framework Directive."); Tomas Felcman, Note, Crafting Employment Policy During EU
Accession: Strategies for Romania and Bulgaria, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 189, 201-02 (2006)

(setting forth terms of the EU "employment nondiscrimination directive").
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C. France'sRole in the European Union
As a member of the EU, France is responsible for implementing EU
regulations and directives and respecting opinions of the European Court of
Justice.7 The EU is a "supranational international organization" that has the
authority to issue legislation in many areas, including employment and
labor law.72 When the EU issues a directive, the member countries are
legally bound to its terms.73 Thus, if there is a conflict between the laws of a
specific country and an EU directive, the directive controls-irrespective of
when the domestic law was implemented.74 Only the ultimate objective of
the directive is binding, however, and the individual countries are free to
choose the specific "form and method of implementation."75 Thus, as long
as the "specified minimum standards" of the directive are achieved by a
country's legislation, the country will have complied with the directive.76
To comply with the EU directive 2000/78/EC regarding equality in the
workplace, France recently amended its Labor Code to include a prohibition
against age discrimination.77 The purpose of the directive was broad-to
establish "minimum requirements" for member countries to prohibit
discrimination in the workplace because of "religion or belief, disability,
age, or sexual orientation., 78 The directive also encompassed discrimination
71. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-3. On March 25, 1957, France entered
into the Treaty of Rome and is therefore a "founding member" of the EU. Id.; see also DESPAX
& ROJOT, supra note 40, at 38 (noting that "French law has often been amended" to comply
with requirements of the international community); Vivant, supra note 35, at 15 (setting forth
"structure" of the European Court of Justice).
72. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 1-1. It is also important to note that the
"term 'labor and employment law' does not translate easily because of differences in language."
Id. at 1-3. The traditional distinction drawn between employment law (which suggests law on
individual employment) and labor law (which suggests law on collective employment) is not as
defined in Europe. Id. Rather, "the European term 'labor law' covers all laws relating to
employment." Id.
73. Id. at 1-22; see also Vivant, supra note 35, at 23 (noting that the Treaty of Rome
clearly explains that directives are binding on each member country but each nation has "the
choice of form and methods.")
74. See INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 1-22 to -23.
75. Id. at 1-22.
76. Id.; see also Vivant, supra note 35, at 23 ("A directive does not generally become
binding on the citizen of a particular Member State until his government has transformed it into
domestic law. This allows Member States to take account of special domestic circumstances in
the drafting of their domestic legislation.").
77. C. TRAY. art. L122-45 (Fr.), translatedin BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66.
78. Nancy J. King et al., Workplace Privacy and DiscriminationIssues Related to Genetic
Data: A Comparative Law Study of the European Union and the United States, 43 AM. Bus. L.J.
79, 145 (2006) (citing Council Directive 2000/78, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC)); see also
Gavin Barrett, "Shall I Compare Thee to... ?" On Article 141 EC and Lawrence, 35 INDUS.
L.J. 93, 96 (2006) ("[EU] [c]ommunity legislation has now extended to combating

38:1053]

UNDERSTANDING FRANCE'S UNREST

1067

in "both the public and private sphere., 79 The EU directive further required
that all states implement the age discrimination measures by 2006.80 In
Article 6 of the directive, certain exceptions for the age discrimination
requirement were permitted. 8'
To comply with the EU directive, Article 122-45 of the French Labor
Code now provides that an employee cannot be "sanctioned or dismissed"
because of that individual's age.82 Interestingly, however, France did not
enact the possible exceptions provided for by the EU directive, and the
statute is clear that all forms of age discrimination are prohibited.83 Thus,
France went beyond the minimum provisions set forth in the EU directive,
and granted its citizens additional protections on the basis of age. Based on
the clear terms of the statute, then, the potential for a "reverse" age
discrimination claim that older workers are given preference over younger
workers exists.84 It does not appear that such a reverse discrimination claim
was even contemplated by the government, however, or would be well
received by the courts.
France's Constitutional Council was quickly forced to consider just such
a reverse age discrimination claim as related to the First Job Contract.8865 The
Council would reject the claim, creating further turmoil in the country.
discrimination in the workplace on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation .... ").
79. King et al., supra note 78, at 145 (citing Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303)
16 (EC)).
80. Vivant, supra note 35, at 64B (citing Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16
(EC)).
81. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 6, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 19-20 (EC); Jarrett Haskovec,
Note, A Beast of a Burden? The New EU Burden-of-Proof Arrangement in Cases of
Employment Discrimination Compared to Existing U.S. Law, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1069, 1083 n.91 (2005) ("This directive also provides for an exception specifically
relating to age and gives examples of differences in treatment that Member States may permit
(Article 6), perhaps reflecting a belief either that making distinctions based on age is reasonable
and legitimate more often than in the case of distinctions made on other grounds or that
potential victims of age discrimination are not in as much need of protection as other potential
victims of discrimination.").
82. C. TRAV. art. L122-45 (Fr.), translated in BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66; see also
INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-69 & n.151 (noting that French Law No. 20011066, which was passed on November 16, 2001, added age to the list of protected classes).
83. C. TRAV. art. L122-45 (Fr.), translated in BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66; see
Richard Baker, Age Discrimination:Implementing the Directive in the EU, THELAWYER.COM,
May 24, 2004, http://lawzone.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=110183 ("The age criterion
[of the EU Directive] was added [to the French Labor Code], with the exception of article 6 of
the employment directive which provides employers with justification for discrimination in
employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives.").
84. C. TRAV. art. L122-45 (Fr.), translatedin BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66
85. See CC decision no. 2006-535DC, Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf.
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III. FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL'S DECISION ON YOUTH LABOR
87

LAW

In an effort to defeat the youth employment legislation in the courts,
numerous plaintiffs brought a claim before France's Constitutional
Council-the highest body considering constitutional claims pertaining to
specific legislation in the country 88-alleging that the First Job Contract
violated the French Constitution.89 The plaintiffs maintained that the law
was unclear, unintelligible, and problematic on many different grounds,
including that it violated the basic protections of equality under the law and
the right to employment and that the law was not enacted pursuant to the
proper procedural channels. 90 The plaintiffs further alleged that the newly
enacted law, which permitted the discharge of individuals twenty-six years
of age or less within the first two years of their employment, violated the
EU directive 2000/78/CE on equality of employment standards, as well as
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. 91
Initially, the Council rejected the argument that there were any
procedural irregularities in the law's passage, noting that all of the
necessary requirements had been satisfied. 92 As to the substance of the
plaintiffs' claims, the Council noted that the law did limit certain
protections given to older workers, including the right to dismissal for only
"real and serious" reasons.93 The Council did not find this problematic,
86. Id.; Smith, supra note 13.
87. The author would like to thank Dr. John E. Sweeney and James Antonio for their
assistance in the translation of the French Constitutional Council decision.
88. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Law, History and Memory: "Republican Moments"
and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Review in France, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49 (1996-97)
(discussing authority and decisions of France's Constitutional Council); James E. Pfander,
Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 611, 618 (2003) ("The Constitutional Council has no appellate or reference jurisdiction
with respect to the ordinary courts; rather, it performs the somewhat limited function of testing
the constitutionality of legislation largely in the abstract, after passage but before promulgation
of laws, at the instigation of the political branches of government."); Edward A. Tomlinson,
Reception of Community Law in France, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 183, 186 (1995) (noting that the
Constitutional Council "reviews the constitutionality of international agreements and statutes
before they go into effect").
89. CC
decision
no.
2006-535DC,
Mar.
30,
2006,
http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dcpdf. Indeed, French discrimination law
originates "from the [French Constitution], which guarantees equality before the law."
DICKSON, supra note 32, at 192.
90. CC
decision
no.
2006-535DC,
Mar.
30,
2006,
http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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however, as the law provides other protections, including some severance
pay to the discharged employee, as well as review of the dismissal (in some
instances) by a labor court judge. 94
Additionally, the Council rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the First
Job Contract violated the principle of equality under the law. 95 The Council
noted that there are no constitutional rules prohibiting the government from
attempting to assist those who are disadvantaged.96 And, that is exactly what
the Council perceived was happening here-the government was simply
responding to the high unemployment rate among youth and attempting to
ameliorate this situation by making it easier for employers to hire these
younger workers. 97 Thus, because the government was acting with the best
interest of everyone in mind, its actions could not be held unconstitutional,
despite the fact that the ultimate result of the statute's passage is that
younger employees will be treated differently under the law. 98
Similarly, the Council rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the law
restricted the right of employment for younger employees. 99 The plaintiffs
had maintained that the law would disproportionately disadvantage the
employment opportunities of younger workers, arguing that because
younger employees would not know the true reason for their dismissal, they
would have an even more difficult time finding subsequent employment.m°
The Council struck down this argument on the same basis that it rejected the
plaintiffs' equality argument-the Council believed that the government
was acting to assist younger individuals in finding employment, and thus
cannot be held to be violating the constitutional rights of younger
workers.'01 The Council further expressed that its role is not to second guess
the legislation by which Parliament seeks to accomplish its goals. 10 2 Thus,
94. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 11 ("In its opinion upholding the law, which was
approved by the parliament [sic] earlier this month, the constitutional council [sic] noted that
young employees who are fired after four months on the job have the right to appeal their
dismissal to a labor court judge.").
95. CC
decision
no.
2006-535DC,
Mar.
30,
2006,
http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Interestingly, the language of the Constitutional Council is not unlike that found in
many decisions of the U.S. courts, which refuse to act as "super-personnel" departments that
oversee the employment decisions of corporations. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't,
427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) ("The courts may not 'act as a super personnel department
that second guesses employers' business judgments."' (quoting Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999))); Davis v.
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while there may be better ways of reducing unemployment among youth,
the Constitutional Council will not attempt to rewrite a law where
Parliament has not violated the constitution in pursuing a legitimate goal,
and the method of attaining that goal is not clearly inappropriate.' 03
The Council further rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the law4
violated France's Declaration of the Rights of Man passed in 1789.'0
Plaintiffs had argued that the law violated certain contractual guarantees and
that the law stripped them of the right to the recourse set out in the
Declaration.'0 5 In dismissing these arguments, the Council found that the
law did not restrict the plaintiffs' liberty to enter into a contractual
relationship, and that the law still provides certain protections to younger
workers. 10 6 In particular, the Council noted that the plaintiffs would still
have a reviewable claim that their dismissal was based on discriminatory
07
grounds.
Finally, the Constitutional Council dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments
that the First Job Contract violated the equality of employment standards set
forth in EU directive 2000/78/CE, as well as other international
agreements.10 8 The Council determined that it was not within its province to
decide whether a particular law comports with a specific directive agreed
upon by the international community.' 0 9 Thus, it need not consider
plaintiffs' claims on this point."°
The Constitutional Council therefore rejected the plaintiffs' claims."' In
essence, the Council determined that it would not second guess the wisdom
of the law passed by the legislature, where, on its face, that law attempted to
assist, rather than disadvantage, younger workers. The Council further
Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Title VII is not designed to make
federal courts 'sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business
decisions."' (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)));
Foster v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 168 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999) ("As we often repeat,
we do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an employer's personnel
decisions; we will not second-guess an employer's policies that are facially legitimate.").
http://www.conseil2006-535DC,
Mar.
30,
2006,
103. CC
decision
no.
constitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Constitutional Council also addressed other provisions of the law, not relevant
to the issue of whether it was constitutionally permissible to terminate younger workers. Id. The
Council upheld some of these additional provisions, but found others contrary to the
constitution. Id.
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declined to visit the issue of whether the First Job Contract complied with
the international agreements of which France is a signatory as this
determination was not within its province.' 12 The plaintiffs have no right to
appeal this decision.' With this ruling, the Council reignited the explosive
situation between protesting young workers and the government. 14 And, the
decision took the issue out of the courts and threw it back into the political
arena. Any hope that President Chirac or Prime Minister Villepin might
have had of avoiding this conflict through a Council ruling striking down
the law was gone."1 5 The violence continued." 6
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE REACTION OF FRENCH YOUTH

The Constitutional Council's ruling, combined with the continued
rioting, forced President Chirac into the weakened position of offering a
watered down version of the law to the unions-reducing the two year trial
period to a single year.' 17 Sensing victory was near, the labor unions and
1 18
youth did not back down, pressing for further protests across the country.
Only a few days later, Chirac scrapped the entire law. " 9 The youth had won.
But at what cost? Weeks of violence and rioting in the streets of France
left the country in disarray. Certainly this type of uncontrolled violence
cannot be endorsed as a way of bringing about social change. 120 Most
Americans watching this story unfold would be unlikely to understand how
112. Id.
113. Moore, supra note 11.
114. See CC decision no. 2006-535DC, Mar. 30, 2006, Ottp://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2006/2006535/2006535dc.pdf; Smith, supra notd 13.
115. See Moore, supra note 11 (noting that the Council's decision validating the First Job
Contract places "new pressure on President Jacques Chirac to resolve the crisis that threatens to
destabilize his government").
116. Smith, supra note 13; Smith, supra note 14.
117. See Smith, supra note 14.
118. Id. (describing the French reaction to Chirac's speech).
119. See Sciolino, supra note 18 (describing Chirac's retreat from the youth labor law).
120. An analogy can be made between the violent protests in France and the extent to
which civil rights protests in the United States turned violent in the 1960s. Interestingly, it has
been recognized that Justice Black became concerned at the time that "the civil disobedience
tactic of the civil right[s] demonstrators was one that could no longer be condoned. Black was
concerned that what were now marches might soon turn into riots and mobs." McKenzie
Webster, Note, The Warren Court's Struggle with the Sit-in Cases and the Constitutionalityof
Segregation in Places of Public Accommodations, 17 J.L. & POL. 373, 395 (2001). Justice Black
did not want protesters believing that they could "continue to break the law in the belief the
Supreme Court will sustain the legality of their claims." Id. at 396 (quoting HUGO L. BLACK &
ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK 92 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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a simple employment law-limited to only two years in duration-could
lead to this type of large-scale protest.121 Without more than a basic
understanding of the terms of the First Job Contract and the Constitutional
Council's decision, the reaction of French youth does appear irrational and
misplaced. However, when taking the entire social context into account, the
riots are not overly surprising. Indeed, frustration among younger workers
in France is not a new phenomenon-it has persisted for years. 12 2 French
youth have suffered from an unbearably high unemployment rate for
decades, and the "constantly increasing rate" of younger workers without
jobs "has drawn the attention of successive governments."'' 2 In 1977, the
government attempted to relieve this persistent problem by reducing social
security obligations for employers hiring younger employees. 24 The
government passed subsequent legislation in 1981, whereby employers
hiring youth would "receive allowances from the state."' 125 And, in 1984, the
French government established a Public Works' program targeted at the
increased employment of individuals between sixteen and twenty-one years
at 22.1%
of age.126 Unemployment of men aged fifteen to twenty-four stood
127
category.
age
same
the
in
women
for
30.2%
was
and
in 1984,
Despite governmental efforts to alleviate this problem, the high
unemployment among French youth persists years later, and currently
stands at the same level as it was twenty years earlier-around 22%.121
Obviously, this high rate of unemployment 29 has been a source of continual
frustration for French youth for decades. The wages, protections, and
benefits of employment in France are significant compared to the rest of the
world. 3 ° French youth, however, are often unable to break into this labor
market, and must watch helplessly as their elders reap the benefits of the
121. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 4 ("But one must also understand that the 35-hour

workweek, the six weeks of paid annual leave, the jobs for life are as endangered a species as
the dodo bird. None of the kids outside Napoleon's tomb want to hear it, of course, but change
happens. Just ask the folks at GM.").
122. See generally Higgins, supra note 20 (noting that the new employment law
"crystallized a deeper French anxiety").
123. DESPAX & ROJOT, supra note 40, at 28.
124. Id. ("'Pacts for employment' excluded from wage-based social security contributions

employers who hired new employees below 25.").
125. Id.
126. See id. at 28-31. "A youth who performs tasks under this system receives
compensation" and the programs "are undertaken for the benefit of society (social work,
improvement of the environment, etc.)." Id. at 30-31.
127. Id. at 29 tbl.9.
128. Galloni, supra note 19.
129. See generally DESPAX & ROJOT, supra note 40, at 28-3 1.

130. See supra Part II.A (discussing labor protections and benefits in France).
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system.13 ' The inability to attain employment has even been "associated
with a wide range of adverse psychological and physical
health effects
132
ranging from a loss of self-esteem to increased mortality."'
It is not surprising, then, that the labor law enacted by the French
government-which was designed to assist younger workers in finding
employment-was met with widespread speculation and protest. 3 3 The law,
which permitted employers to discharge employees under the age of
twenty-six without cause if the termination occurred within two years of the
worker's start date, 34 rather than the traditional one-to-three month trial
period, 135 was likely seen as an attempt to institute yet another bar to their
ultimate goal-attaining permanent employment with its associated
benefits. 136 French youth
perceived that they were truly the "throwaway" or
' 37
"Kleenex generation.'

With the government seemingly against them, and their claim rejected by
the Constitutional Council, French youth initiated an aggressive and
widespread protest in the country.'38 Such protests are commonplace in
French culture, and are almost considered a right-of-passage for each
generation. 139 Indeed, in May 1968 students and unions across France
engaged in protests challenging "restrictive government policies" that
resulted in clashes with police, the occupation of French universities, and
strikes in many factories.140 French President Charles de Gaulle resigned the
131. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28 (discussing unemployment levels of
French youth).
132. Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and
Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS.L. REV. 363, 399 (2002).
133. See supra notes 4-22 and accompanying text (discussing reaction of French youth to
the proposed labor law).
134. Sciolino & Smith, supra note 3 (discussing the proposed French labor law).
135. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-9.
136. See Smith, supra note 14 (discussing how French youth perceived the employment
law).
137. See John Lichfield, Gangs Set Paris on Fire in Law Protests, INDEPENDENT (UK),
Mar. 24, 2006, at 28 ("Young university protesters say the law treats them as a 'throwaway'
generation, deprived of the employment protections enjoyed by their parents. . . . Other
demonstrators carried placards accusing the jobs law of making the young into a 'Kleenex'
generation ....
").
138. See Smith, supra note 13.
139. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing various French student
protests over time).
140. Kathleen Neal Cleaver, Mobilizing for Mumia Abu-Jamal in Paris, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 327, 329 (1998) (discussing student strike in 1968 and noting that "French students
fought pitched battles with the police in the streets of Paris" in protest of "restrictive
government policies"); see Lauren J. Aste, Reforming French CorporateGovernance: A Return
to the Two-Tier Board?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 41 (1999) ("May 1968 [was] a
watershed month in French history in which students and union members led protests
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following year. 4 ' In 1986, a conservative French government held off on a
proposal to "implement university reform" because of widespread student
protests.'42 In 1994, France's Prime Minister was forced-in the face of
widespread youth protests-to back away from a proposal to decrease the
minimum wage for younger workers. 143 Even as recently as 2005, the
Education Minister shelved essential parts of a school reform proposal
when students and instructors protested.'" President Chirac recently
summarized this "culture of social conflict" in France, stating that the
country has a "longstanding tradition" of moving "toward confrontation
[rather] than to dialogue."'' 45 Additionally, the powerful unions in Franceguaranteed to citizens by the constitution-provide French youth with a
built-in collective means of protest that is almost nonexistent in the United
States. 146 As demonstrated by the latest round of demonstrations by French

throughout France, with students occupying French universities and employees conducting 'sitdown' strikes in their factories. As a result, employees and students-representatives of the
'little people'-gained a greater voice in politics.") (footnote omitted); Ascanio Piomelli,
Foucault'sApproach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for CollaborativeLawyering, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 395, 420 n.95 (2004) ("[T]he "events of May 1968, in which student uprisings,
violently confronted by police, were followed by spontaneous strikes by workers and then a
general strike that was ultimately defused by de Gaulle with assistance from the French
Communist Party.") (citation omitted).
141. See Ethan Schwartz, Note, Politics as Usual: The History of European Community
Merger Control, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 607, 617 (1993) ("Charles De [sic] Gaulle had resigned the
French Presidency in 1969 ....
");see also Michael I. Swygert, Valparaiso University School of
Law, 1879-2004: A Contextual History, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 627, 934 (2004) (noting that
student protests of the Vietnam War "nearly toppled the government of De [sic] Gaulle in

France" (quoting
CULTURAL LIFE,

JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE: 500 YEARS OF WESTERN
1500 TO THE PRESENT 764 (2000))) (internal quotation marks omitted).

142. French
Job
Law
'Constitutional,'
BBC
NEws,
Mar.
30, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/4860632.stm (summarizing the impact of different
student protests in France over time).
143. Katrin Bennhold, French Mass Protest Challenges Villepin; 400,000 March Against
His Job Plan, INT'L HERALD TRtB., Mar. 8, 2006, at 3.
144. See French Job Law "Constitutional," supra note 142 (summarizing the student and
teacher protests over the reform proposal in 2005). France is not alone in its dilemma of
properly addressing student protests. In Chile, over 700,000 teenagers recently abandoned their
classrooms to protest the "education system" which they perceive as "inferior and
discriminatory." Larry Rohter, Chilean Promised a New Deal; Now Striking Youth Demand It,
N.Y. TES,
June 5, 2006, at A11. The country's President is struggling to address this
"domestic crisis." Id.
145. Thomas Fuller, Workers and Bosses: Friends or Foes?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 11,
2005, at 1.
146. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of labor
organizations in France).
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youth, these unions are instrumental in organizing and conducting the
protests. 147

Thus, the student protests of the First Job Contract were not simply an
anomaly. These student protests have occurred numerous times over the
years, and have produced effective results for the protesters. By backing
down to student demands in the past, France has fostered an environment
where such protesting is not only acceptable, but also viewed as one of the
primary means of effectuating social change. And, given the persistently
high level of youth unemployment in the country, the most recent series of
student protests is not likely to be the last.
American youth have had a far different reaction to legislation and court
decisions affording greater protections to older employees. Students in this
country have remained indifferent toward the erosion of their employment
rights. The structure of American law and cultural context of American
society reveals why.
V. THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
Labor law in the United States differs from France in many respects.
French employees work fewer hours, have more statutorily imposed
benefits, and enjoy more union protections than their American
counterparts. 14 8 The most significant difference, however, goes much more
to the basic foundation of the legal protections offered in the two countries.
While employees in France must be given a legitimate reason for their
discipline or termination, 149 employees in the United States can be
terminated for any "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."15 Thus, most
employers in the United States, outside of the union setting,"' are free to

147. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 19 (stating that unions orchestrated the protests "that drew
millions of people onto the streets"); Smith, supra note 16 (noting that trade unions have
"backed" the students in the country).
148. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing various protections and benefits of French
employment law).
149. BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66, at IX-2 to -3; LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 335.
150. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 896-98 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (analyzing
whether employer provided a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse
employment action); Lee v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 432 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Fasold
v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184-86 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).
151. For an overview of the general protections afforded by unions in the United States, see
generally Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L.
REV.

169 (1991).
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terminate their employees within the confines of anti-discrimination law
and certain other public policy and statutorily created exceptions. 52
A. Terminationfor any NondiscriminatoryReason: Employment-at-Will
The United States recognizes "employment-at-will"-the concept that an
employer may terminate an employee for just about any reason that is not
based on the employee's race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age or

disability.'53 The theory traces its origins back to the nineteenth century U.S.
commentator Horace Wood who remarked that "general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will." '54 Though initially not well-received by the
courts, and in direct contravention to English common law, the theory
eventually gained widespread acceptance in the United States.' 55 Currently,
approximately two-thirds of the American workforce is subject to the
employment-at-will doctrine, and these individuals go to work each day
knowing that their employers can fire them at any time with little or no
adverse consequences to the company. 5 6 Indeed, the judiciary in the United
States-previously reluctant to acknowledge the doctrine-has now taken a
very "narrow view" of its authority to examine employment decisions
where there is no contract between the employer and employee.157
Even where the worker had some expectation of "job security," the
employment-at-will doctrine will undermine these expectations. 58 In
152. See generally Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment at
Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 693-701 (1991) (discussing various exceptions to the employmentat-will doctrine).
153. See id. at 689 ("The doctrine of employment at will has been a fixture of American
common law for approximately a century."); supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text
(discussing American protections against employment discrimination).
154. Michael T. Zoretic, Comment, Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence: Washington Gives at
Will Employees a Gun with No Ammunition to Fight Against Unjust Dismissal, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 709, 711 (1991) (quoting H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT 134 (1877)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.; see Partee, supra note 152, at 692 ("English common law presumed that
employment for an indefinite period was for a year, in the absence of custom or evidence to the
contrary.").
156. Zoretic, supra note 154, at 711 n.4 ("Estimates vary, but approximately 60 to 65
percent of all employees are hired on an at will basis.").
157. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1818 (1980) [hereinafter Protecting At
Will Employees]; Zoretic, supra note 154, at 711-13. Indeed, when considering discrimination
cases, the courts frequently "rely on the employment at will doctrine to defeat the plaintiff's
case." Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
NationalDischarge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1459 (1996).
158. See ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 157.
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essence, then, the ongoing employment relationship is seen as a "series of
unilateral contracts" offered by the employer; all the employer is required to
do to end a worker's employment is to revoke the offer.1 59 Because the
individual did not "bargain for an express contractual protection against
wrongful discharge,"' 160 the courts do not feel required to examine an
employer's nondiscriminatory justifications for an adverse employment
action, irrespective of whether the action was taken "for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong." 16' Employers have therefore been
162
issued a "license to be mean" in this country.
The license to be mean, however, does not translate into a license to
discriminate. More specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides that it is illegal for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 163

Thus, employers are restricted from making employment decisions on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin by the clear terms of
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1819.
161. Id. (quoting Payne v. W. & AtI. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Walters, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Zoretic, supra note 154, at 712 (discussing "[m]utuality of contract" and the at-will
employment relationship).
162. McGinley, supra note 157 (quoting Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Condescending Contradictions:Richard Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination,
46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 233 (1994)). In this respect, "judges often rely on the employment at will
doctrine to conclude that the mere fact that the plaintiff proved that he was wrongfully
discharged is insufficient to establish illegal discrimination." Id.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (2000). The language in the first paragraph has been
recognized as providing the basis for prohibiting intentional discrimination, as it prohibits
discrimination "because of' a protected characteristic. See, e.g., Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty.
Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2005) (providing that § 2000e-2(a)(1) forms the basis for
disparate treatment analysis under federal anti-discrimination law). The language in the second
paragraph has been recognized as giving rise to disparate impact discrimination claims-those
claims where no showing of intent is required. See, e.g., In re Employment Discrimination
Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1310-11, 1310 n.9 (11 th Cir. 1999) (setting forth the basis
for recognition of the theory of unintentional employment discrimination).
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Title VII. Federal law further prohibits employers from discriminating on
the basis of age" or disability. 65
In the seminil case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,166 a failure to
hire case, the Supreme Court clearly enunciated the standard- and burdenshifting framework for establishing a case of discrimination under
American law. 67 Under the Supreme Court's analysis, an individual
alleging employment discrimination must come forward with a prima facie
case. 168 This requires a showing that the individual is a member of a
protected class, is qualified for the position, suffered an adverse action, and
that the employer continued to seek applications for the job opening. 169 The
burden then shifts to the employer to establish any "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" justifying the particular employment decision. 70
Finally, the individual has an opportunity to demonstrate that the
employer's purported legitimate reason is a pretext for discrimination. 7 '
Under this analysis, then, an employer is able to avoid liability for taking an
adverse action against an employee where that decision is based on any
nondiscriminatory reason.' 72
In addition to the basic structure of employment law, the remedies for an
employee's discharge vary significantly between France and the United
States as well. In France, where a termination is for "just cause," employees
are entitled to benefits that include payment of at least "one-tenth of a
month's salary for each year of service."' 173 In the United States, an
employee that is terminated for any nondiscriminatory reason is entitled to
164. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); id. § 623(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination "because
of such individual's age").
165. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination "because of the disability of [an]
individual").
166. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
167. Id. at 802-03. McDonnell Douglas set forth the standard for establishing
discrimination through circumstantial evidence of discrimination. This analysis changes when
an employee is able to show discrimination through more direct evidence. See generally Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
168. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.

169. Id. Though a hiring case, these elements have been applied to all cases of disparate
treatment discrimination, and the fourth prong of the test is modified to fit the facts of the
particular case. See id. at 802 n. 13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.").
170. Id. at 802.
171. Id. at 804.
172. Id. at 802-04.
173. Vivant, supra note 35, at 98; see INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-13;
LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 337.
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nothing. 174 An employer that discriminates in France is subject to potential
criminal and civil penalties.1 75 In the United States, however, employers that
discriminate are subject only to possible civil penalties, and there is no
mechanism to impose any criminal sanctions for any employer's violation
of anti-discrimination laws. 176 Under Title VII, 177 these civil penalties
include compensatory and punitive damages, equitable relief
(including
78
1
fees.
attorney's
and
relief,
injunctive
pay),
front
and
pay
back
At-will-employment in the United States is therefore the most significant
difference with France's employment structure, which permits only
discharge for just cause. As demonstrated above, however, there is an
important overlap between the anti-discrimination laws of the two
countries. The United States provides an exception to its at-willemployment scheme where the company's employment action is based on
the employee's race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or disability.
France prohibits discrimination on all of these grounds, 179 and its statute
goes even further in covering additional protected classes. 8 ° Though the
remedies and enforcement schemes of the two countries vary dramatically,
both nations have taken important steps to prevent discrimination on many
of the same protected grounds-including the prevention of age
discrimination.

174. See, e.g., Cordray v. 135-80 Travel Plaza, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017-18 (D.
Neb. 2005) (entering summary judgment for the employer "providing that the plaintiff takes
nothing and her complaint is dismissed with prejudice").
175. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing criminal and civil penalties
for employment discrimination in France).
176. See Gitter, supra note 62, at 505 ("[T]he United States imposes civil penalties to
redress this type of prejudice in the workplace.").
177. The Americans with Disabilities Act remedial provisions mirror those of Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(a)(2) (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) damages
provisions differ, however. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) (providing damages under the
ADEA); see also Downey v. Comm'r, 33 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1994) ("With respect to
remedies, the only difference between the scheme embodied under the ADEA and that under
Title VII is that under the ADEA a plaintiff may often recover liquidated damages in addition to
lost wages when the employer's violation of the statute has been willful.").
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (providing injunctive and equitable relief for
intentional discrimination claims); § 198la(b) (providing compensatory and punitive damages
for intentional discrimination claims only). Statutory limitations exist for the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages an employer can be subject to. § 1981a(b)(3). In no event
will an employer be liable for over $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. §
1981a(b)(3)(D).
179. The French statute does not specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of color,
though it does prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. See C. TRAV. art. L122-45 (Fr.),
translatedin BERMANN & KIRCH, supra note 66.
180. See id.
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B. Discriminationon the Basis of Age
Employment discrimination law is a statutorily created exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine in the United States.' 8 1 In the early 1960s,
Congress debated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and attempted to determine
as a matter of policy how far this exception should extend, and what
protections should be afforded to workers in this country.'8 2 After much
debate, it was resolved that employment discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" should not be permitted. 83
Whether to include age as a basis for protection from discrimination was
also considered during the initial debates; however, the age provisions were
later omitted. 18 4 Congress did not walk completely away from the issue,
however, and the legislature directed-within the text of the Civil Rights
Act-that the Secretary of Labor "make a full and complete study of the
factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because
of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy and
'
individuals affected."185
It was therefore clear that Congress was openly
in employment because of age."' 18 6
discrimination
worried about "arbitrary
The Secretary of Labor subsequently issued his report in June 1965,
concluding that age discrimination in employment "was a serious national
problem" that should be remedied through the enactment of federal law.187
181. See McGinley, supra note 157, at 1459 ("[E]mployment discrimination law is a very
narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine .... ").
182. See, e.g., Mark R. Azman, Note, The Development of Title VII Protection for
American Citizens Employed Abroad by American Employers: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 531, 531-32 (1992) (noting the "long struggle," which
lasted approximately twenty years, to pass the discrimination statute).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
184. Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 507, 511-12 (1995);
see also Roberta Sue Alexander, Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis for Age
Discriminationin a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 75, 78 (1999) (discussing
the debate over whether to include age in the text of Title VII).
185. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265
(1964). The Civil Rights Act further required that the Secretary of Labor prepare a report for
Congress by June 30, 1965, setting forth the results of the study as well as recommendations for
Congressional legislation on age discrimination. § 715, 78 Stat. at 265; see also Steven J.
Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 235 (1990) (discussing Congress' decision to "defer the
age issue" until after receipt of the report from the Secretary of Labor).
186. § 715, 78 Stat. at 265.
187. BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 6 (2003) (discussing the report of the Secretary of Labor). The Secretary of Labor's report
began quite poetically, noting that Browning wrote on the subject of age by stating, "'The best
is yet to be / The last of life, for which the first was made.' A century later, reality has still not
caught up with that poetry." W. WILLARD WIRTZ, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
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At the request of Congress, the Secretary of Labor subsequently submitted
draft legislation in early 1967 targeted at eliminating age discrimination in
the workplace. 18 8 In January 1967, President Lyndon Johnson sent a
message to Congress recommending the enactment of legislation
prohibiting discrimination against individuals aged forty-five to sixty-five
in the workplace. 8 9 President Johnson recognized that the economic loss
caused by age discrimination was significant, but that "the greater loss is the
cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being, which joblessness imposes on
these citizens and their families." 19 Congress ultimately determined that
those between the ages of forty and sixty-five deserved protection-creating
the upper threshold because it recognized that individuals typically began to
receive social security benefits and proceeds from pension plans at this
age. 191

Importantly, Congress also debated whether to include a lower age
threshold in the statute.192 A lower age restriction had been urged by a group
of airline stewardesses, some of whom were not permitted to keep their jobs
after reaching thirty-two years of age.' 93 Congress found their testimony
"highly effective and persuasive."' 194 Indeed, the situation of these
stewardesses demonstrated the "apparent gross and arbitrary employment
distinction based on age alone."' 95 It was determined, however, that if
Congress lowered the protected age below forty, the results would be
counterproductive, thereby "lessen[ing] the primary objective; that is, the
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT

(1965), reprinted in

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S.

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY

OF

THE

AGE

DISCRIMINATION INEMPLOYMENT ACT 19 (1981); see also D. Aaron Lacy, You Are Not Quite as
Old as You Think: Making the Case for Reverse Age Discrimination Under the ADEA, 26
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 363, 367 (2005) (discussing the results of the report from Secretary
of Labor).
188. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 7.
189. LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 120.06, at 120-13 (Bender 2d ed.
2004). In the original version of the statute, the protected group included individuals forty to
sixty-five. Id.
190. Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Americans, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 37 (Jan. 23, 1967).
191. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 8. Congress determined that it would protect
individuals that were forty years of age-rather than forty-five years old as suggested by the
President-because forty is "the age at which age discrimination in employment becomes
evident." H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
192. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 7-8.
193. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6 (1967) as reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
194. Id.; see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 8 (setting forth Congress' debate
over whether to lower the age restriction below forty).
195. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 7 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219; see
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 8 (quoting legislative history regarding the debate on
whether to lower the age limit in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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promotion of employment opportunities for older workers."' 96 Congress
emphasized that while it was sympathetic to younger workers, the "only
reason" that it did not identify younger employees for protection was that it
feared a lower age restriction would undermine the "major objective of the

bill."' 97 Indeed, in certain industries with a higher proportion of older
workers, Congress seemed to encourage the hiring of younger employees to
achieve a "reasonable age balance in [the company's] employment
structure."' 98
Congress went forward with the statute, passing the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).' 99 President Johnson signed the
measure into law on December 16, 19 6 7 ."0 The express congressional
findings set forth in the ADEA emphasized that it was aimed at protecting
older workers.2"' These findings provide that "older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment" and that
unemployment is "high among older workers."2 2 Congress made it clear
that "the purpose [of the statute was] to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age ... ,,203 Age discrimination in
the United States was finally illegal under federal law. The plain terms of
the statute make it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age.' , 204 The statute contains no
mention, however, of the need to protect those younger than forty from age
discrimination. 205
196. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
197. Id. at 7.
198. Id. Congress cited the railroad industry as an example of an industry dominated by
older employees, where one-sixth of the engineers were at least sixty-five years of age. Id.
199. LARSON, supra note 189; LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 8.
200. LARSON, supra note 189.
201. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
202. Id. § 621 (a).
203. Id. § 621(b).
204. Id. § 623(a)(1). The statute contains other prohibitions for an employer as well, also
making it illegal "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... because of such individual's
age; or to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with [the statute]." Id. §
623(a)(2)-(3). This prohibitive language of the ADEA is almost identical to the prohibitive
language of Title VII. See Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Coverfor Age Discrimination:Twilight
of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1995) (noting that the operative language of the ADEA
was adopted "word-for-word from Title VII"); Sloan, supra note 184, at 511 ("[T]he statutory
language of the ADEA borrows directly from Title VII.").
205. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Interestingly, in 1975, Congress passed
legislation protecting individuals from being discriminated against "on the basis of age" in
being considered for "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
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Over the years, the ADEA would be subject to several revisions,
including an increase in the breadth of coverage. In 1979, the protections of
the ADEA were extended to those who were seventy years old. 206 In the
legislative history to this amendment, Congress noted a concern that raising
the age ceiling would "reduce employment opportunities for younger
workers. ' z 7 Congress wrote the impact on younger employees off as
negligible, however, noting that the higher age limits would increase the
work force by two-tenths of one percent at most. 2 8 In 1986, the upper age
limit would be completely eliminated, leaving all workers forty and older
protected by the statute, with certain exceptions and employer defenses. 2 9
One revision that would never come, however, would be a lowering of the
ADEA are still
the
protected age under the statute, and the provisions of 21
0
"limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age."
When enacted, the statute had widespread endorsement, and was not the
subject of "partisan politics" or special interest lobbying. 211 Indeed, the
statute was passed "[w]ithout much fanfare." 212 This raises the question as
to why younger Americans were not pressing their way before Congress to
have the age limits reduced so that they would be afforded protections from
age discrimination as well. The answer cannot be that this group was
unaware of the legislation. As noted, a group of stewardesses testified
§ 6102 (2000). This prohibition against age discrimination protects individuals of all ages. Id.;
see Tara-Ann Topputo, Note, Finding a Hole in the ADEA: Allowing a Cause of Action for Age
DiscriminationAmong Employees Within the Age Protected Class, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 169,
173 (2003) (noting that under legislation regarding federal programs or assistance, "both the
young and old received protection against age discrimination").
206. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 11. This extension was passed as part of the
1978 amendments to the statute, which became effective on January 1, 1979. Id.
207. S. REP. No. 95-493, at 4 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507; see
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 11-12.
208. S.REP.No.95-493, at 4 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507.
209. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 11, 14. The exceptions to the elimination of
the upper age limit included firefighters and police officers. Id. at 14. For a general discussion
of the defenses available to an employer in an ADEA case, see Elena Minkin, Note, Flourishing
Forties Against Flaming Fifties: Is Reverse Age Discrimination Actionable Under the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act?, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 225, 229 (2003). See also Aaron J.
Rogers, Note, DiscriminationAgainst Younger Members of the ADEA's Protected Class, 89
IOWA L. REV. 313, 321 (2003).
210. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); see also Amy L. Schuchman, Note, The Special Problem of
the "Younger Older Worker": Reverse Age Discriminationand the ADEA, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
339, 341 (2004) (discussing coverage of the ADEA).
211. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 187, at 8.
212. Matthew H. Hawes & W. Scott Hardy, Morelli v. Cedel: Ignoring Jurisdictional
Limits and Ouyfanking Congress Towards the Internationalizationof the ADEA, 65 U. PITT. L.
REV. 507, 513 (2004) (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: LAW OF AGE
DISCRIMINATION AND MANDATORY RETIREMENT

15 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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before Congress expressing their concerns about applying the lower age
limit to the airline industry, and Congress found their arguments "highly
effective and persuasive."2'13 And when the age limits were increased,
Congress recognized the possibility that the amendment could result in
fewer jobs for younger Americans due to the larger supply of labor.2 14
Perhaps if additional witnesses had come forward when the legislation was
proposed, or if the youth of this country had staged peaceful protests and
lobbied Congress when the amendments were being considered, the lower
age limit would have been reduced below forty or completely eliminated. 15
Regardless, by not opposing or attempting to influence this legislation or its
amendments, American youth were required to accept the fact that they
would be afforded fewer protections in the workplace than older Americans.
Ambivalence had led to the chipping away of their employment rights. 1 6

VI. THE SUPREME COURT FURTHER RESTRICTS THE PROTECTIONS OF
YOUNGER WORKERS

As discussed above, the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the
enactment of the ADEA and the complete abandonment of the upper limits
of age protections. Though these protections were necessary to help protect
older workers from discrimination,2 17 the legislation did nothing to prohibit
age discrimination that might occur against younger workers. Much more
recently, however, the Supreme Court weighed in on whether younger
workers should be afforded the same protections from age discrimination as
older employees.1 8 The Court also reassessed how the protections of the

213. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6-7 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
214. S.REP. No. 95-493, at 4 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507.
215. One notable example of a younger individual challenging the age-bias of the American
system involves Stacy Stillman, a twenty-eight-year-old woman who alleged in a lawsuit that
her elimination from "the island" on the television show Survivor was motivated by producers
with a desire for a seventy-two-year-old contestant to prevail. See Minkin, supra note 209, at
225 (discussing the lawsuit); see also Tara Brenner, Note, A "Quizzical" Look into the Need for
Reality Television Show Regulation, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 873, 874 (2005) (discussing
Stillman's lawsuit which "allege[d] producer interference").
216. Interestingly, at least one court has held that an individual who is less than forty would
have standing to bring a claim of retaliation under the ADEA. See Anderson v. Phillips Petrol.
Co., 722 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D. Kan. 1989) ("This court finds that any person, whether or not
that person is 40 or older who participates in or files an age discrimination charge, is protected
under the ADEA from retaliation."). Thus, if an individual were to oppose an act that would be
considered retaliatory under the ADEA, they might have a viable claim irrespective of their age.
217. See Topputo, supra note 205, at 172-74 (discussing the history of age discrimination
and the need for statutory protection).
218. See generallyGen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
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ADEA can be enforced generally, and what level of protection age should
be given under the law. 219

For many years, a debate persisted over whether a so-called "reverse age
discrimination" claim was cognizable under the ADEA. 220 A reverse
discrimination claim in the age context, however, is significantly different
from a reverse discrimination claim on other protected bases under Title
VII. 221 This is because the ADEA requires that an individual reach forty
years of age before attaining standing under the statute. 2 Thus, to have any
reverse
claim of discrimination under the ADEA-including
discrimination-the plaintiff must be at least forty years old to be in the
protected class. 223 The plaintiffs alleging such a reverse age discrimination
claim would therefore maintain that they were being discriminated against
in favor of employees that were even older.22 4' For example, a forty-fiveyear-old teacher could allege that she was discriminated against in favor of
a fifty-five-year-old instructor who received greater health benefits simply
because of her older age. Though instinctively it might seem unlikely that
an employer would take an employment action purely on the basis of age to
advantage an older worker,225 such claims are not unusual, particularly in
the context of the administration of benefits and retirement plans. 22 6 Thus,
unlike the classic reverse race discrimination case alleging that a white
employee was terminated in favor of a black worker, 227 a reverse age
discrimination claim requires that both employees be in the same protected
219. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
220. See generally Tracey A. Cullen, Note, Reverse Age DiscriminationSuits and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 271 (2003)
(summarizing cases and discussing opposing views on whether reverse age discrimination
should be recognized under the ADEA).
221. See Minkin, supra note 209, at 226 (noting the "different connotation" of reverse
discrimination in age context versus other protected classes).
222. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (2000).
223. Id.
224. See Lacy, supra note 187, at 371 (describing one type of reverse age discrimination as
"the right of a younger protected worker to sue his employer because the employer gave
preferential employment benefits to someone older because of age").
225. See Schuchman, supra note 210, at 340 (noting that at first glance "one may intuitively
dismiss reverse age discrimination as irrational, absurd, or unintended by Congress").
226. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 236-39 (discussing factual basis for reverse
discrimination claim in Cline).
227. See, e.g., Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2006)
(involving white plaintiffs alleging that they were terminated and replaced with three black
workers). Reverse discrimination claims on the basis of sex are also not uncommon, i.e., where
a male plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against in favor of a female employee. See,
e.g., Minkin, supra note 209, at 226 (noting that male employees have brought reverse
discrimination claims under Title VII).
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class-over forty-and that an employment action was taken that favored
the older worker.228

Until 2002, the appellate courts had uniformly rejected the argument that
a reverse age discrimination claim could be brought under the statute.229 In
the most notable of these cases, Hamilton v. Caterpillar,Inc.,23° the Seventh
Circuit considered a reverse age discrimination claim brought by a group of
plaintiffs between the ages of forty and fifty who alleged that an early
retirement plan offered only to those over fifty was discriminatory.23' In
rejecting the claim, the court opined that Congress could not have intended
to protect younger workers from being given less preferential treatment than
older workers, otherwise "limiting the protected class to those 40 and above
would make little sense. 232 The court thus declined to "open the floodgates
to attacks on every retirement plan," and concluded that reverse age
discrimination is not cognizable under the ADEA.23 3
A. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline: Reverse Age
Discrimination
Despite the legal conclusion by Hamilton and other courts that reverse
age discrimination claims were not viable,234 the legal landscape would soon
change when the Sixth Circuit considered Cline v. General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc., 23 a case that would subsequently be appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.236

228. See Schuchman, supra note 210, at 340 ("Unlike Title VII, where anyone can sue if
discriminated against on the basis of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, one
must be forty or older to invoke the ADEA's protections.").
229. See Lacy, supra note 187, at 372-75 (discussing court decisions rejecting argument
that younger workers have discrimination claims based on employer's treatment of older
workers).
230. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
231. Id. at 1227.
232. Id.; see also Paul L. Arrington, Note, Not Always Protected: Reverse Age
Discriminationand the Supreme Court's Decision in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline, 73 UMKC L. REV. 543, 554-55 (2005) (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Hamilton).
233. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228.
234. See, e.g., Minkin, supra note 209, at 233-38 (discussing court decisions rejecting
reverse age discrimination claims).
235. 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
236. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
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1. Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
In Cline, a group of employees between the ages of forty and forty-nine
brought suit against their employer and labor union alleging that a newly
negotiated collective bargaining agreement was discriminatory on the basis
of age.237 Under the new agreement, the company no longer had an
obligation to afford full health coverage to retirees. 238 An exception to the
new agreement, however, provided that workers who were fifty years or
older on a specific date would still be provided with full health coverage
when they retired.23 9 The plaintiffs' suit maintained that this exception
violated the ADEA because it discriminated against those between the ages
of forty and forty-nine, who were still within the statute's protected age
range.24 ° The district court granted the company's motion to dismiss,
concluding that reverse age discrimination was not cognizable under the
ADEA, and that Congress was only concerned with protecting older
employees when it passed this age legislation.241
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had a very different view of the case
than the district court. The Sixth Circuit began-where it should-with the
plain language of the ADEA, quoting the text of the statute and
emphasizing that "'any individual"' is protected from an adverse
employment action taken "'because of such individual's age."' 24 2 The court
reasoned that the ADEA's text and the canons of statutory construction
"easily" resolve the case, because the statute "clearly and unambiguously"
prohibits a company from distributing benefits on the basis of an
employee's age.24 3 To hold otherwise, the court opined, would require an
"interpretive reading of the statute," which is not within the court's
province.24

237. Cline, 296 F.3d at 467-68.
238. Id. at 468.
239. Id.
240. Id. See generally Lacy, supra note 187, at 375-81 (discussing plaintiffs' claims and
lower court decisions in Cline).
241. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000);
see also Cline, 296 F.3d at 468.
242. Cline, 296 F.3d at 469 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)) (emphasis added by the court).
The Cline decision garnered three separate opinions: (1) the holding of the court authored by
Judge Ryan, id. at 467-72; (2) a concurring opinion by Judge Cole, id. at 472-76 (Cole, J.,
concurring); and (3) a dissent by district court Judge Williams, sitting by designation, id. at
476-77 (Williams, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 469 (majority opinion).
244. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Cole agreed that the "plain language" of the statute
permits claims of reverse age discrimination. Id. at 472 (Cole, J., concurring). He emphasized
that there was "no legally acceptable reason [to look] beyond the language of the statute here."
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The court further found that the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Hamilton,
and its progeny, 245 were unpersuasive because they relied too heavily on
"generalized language" from the "Statement of Findings and Purpose" in
the statute, and disregarded the rule that a court should focus solely, on the
plain terms of the statute. 246 The court further reasoned that Congress' stated
desire "to protect 'older workers' and 'older persons"' in the statute was not
inconsistent with the court's reasoning that it is illegal to afford greater
benefits to those over fifty than those over forty. 247 As the court noted, the
statute is specifically designed to protect those who are forty years of age or
older. 248 The court further pointed out that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcing the
ADEA, had interpreted the statute as prohibiting discrimination against
younger employees within the protected class to the advantage of older
workers.2 49 The court found the EEOC's interpretation of the statute to be "a
true rendering of the language" of the ADEA.2 '0 The court concluded its
analysis by noting that if Congress had only wanted to protect employees
who were251 "relatively older, it clearly had the power and acuity to do so. It
did not.,

Id. Judge Cole, however, expressed "serious doubts" about whether this result was intended by
Congress. Id.
245. See Minkin, supra note 209, at 233-38 (discussing the majority view of circuit courts
rejecting claims of reverse discrimination under the ADEA).
246. Cline, 296 F.3d at 470; see also Minkin, supra note 209, at 242 (discussing the Sixth
Circuit's criticism of the Hamilton decision). The dissent in the case, however, was persuaded
by the reasoning in Hamilton and further warned that the majority's decision "could have a
devastating effect on the collective bargaining process, calling into question the validity of
seniority and early retirement programs . . . across the country." Cline, 296 F.3d at 476
(Williams, J., dissenting).
247. Cline, 296 F.3d at 470. The court also went out of its way to attack the "reverse
discrimination" terminology assigned to this type of case, which "has no ascertainable meaning
in the law." Id. at 471. The court emphasized that "[a]n action is either discriminatory or it is not
discriminatory, and some discriminatory actions are prohibited by law." Id.
248. Id. See generally Lacy, supra note 187, at 375-78 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Cline).
249. Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a)).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 472. The Court also offered the following "syllogism" to summarize the case:
The ADEA expressly prohibits denying any employee within the protected
class an employment benefit solely because of age. The [new collective
bargaining agreement] provision in question denies a group of employees
within the protected class an employee benefit based solely on their age.
Therefore, the ADEA prohibits the [new agreement] provision in question.
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U.S. Supreme Court Decision

After the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cline, the appellate courts had a
clear circuit split on the issue of whether reverse discrimination claims
should be permitted under the ADEA.252 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve this divide.253 Justice Souter, writing for the majority,
began the Court's opinion by noting that "Congress's interpretive clues
speak almost unanimously" to a reading of the ADEA that prohibits
discrimination "against workers who are older than the ones getting treated
better., 25 4 To support this conclusion, the Court looked to the report of the
Secretary of Labor that was commissioned by Congress, noting that the
Secretary did not identify any "unfair advantages accruing to older
employees at the expense of their juniors., 255 Rather, the report emphasized
the monetary advantages employers often have to replace older workers
with younger employees. 6
The Court also referenced the congressional hearings on the statute,
noting that the testimony "dwelled on unjustified assumptions about the
effect of age on ability to work. 257 Thus, the concern during the hearings
was that it is more difficult for a person to find and maintain employment as
that person gets older. 258 The Court was further persuaded by the fact that
"nothing" in the congressional hearings indicated any concern that
employees were worried over "discrimination in favor of their seniors. 259
The Court emphasized that "the statements of purpose and findings" in the
statute highlight concerns over barriers in the workplace faced by "older
persons," thus expressing a concern about "the effects of age as intensifying
over time. 26°
Within this context, the Court concluded that the statutory language
prohibiting "'discriminat[ion] .. .because of [an] individual's age'' 261 was
targeted at protecting "a relatively old worker from discrimination that
252. See Cullen, supra note 220, at 280-91 (discussing the existence of a circuit split on the
issue of reverse age discrimination claims).
253. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
254. Id. at 586.
255. Id. at 587; see Rebecca L. Ennis, Casenotes, General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline: Shrinking the Realm of Possibilityfor Reverse Age DiscriminationSuits, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 753, 759 (2005) (discussing the Court's reliance on the report of the Secretary of Labor).
256. Cline, 540 U.S. at 587.
257. Id. at 588.
258. Id. at 588-89.
259. Id. at 589; see Lacy, supra note 187, at 381 (noting that the Supreme Court looked to
legislative history to conclude that "Congress was concerned with protecting older employees
relative to younger employees").
260. Cline, 540 U.S. at 589-90.
261. Id. at 590 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623).
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works to the advantage of the relatively young., 26 2 The Court also noted that
"[c]ommon experience" supports this reading of the statute.26 3 In this regard,
the Court emphasized the traditional notions that favor the youth of our
society, stating that:
One commonplace conception of American society in recent
decades is its character as a "youth culture," and in a world where
younger is better, talk about discrimination because of age is
naturally understood to refer to discrimination against the
older ....
The youthful deficiencies of inexperience and
unsteadiness invite stereotypical and discriminatory thinking about
those a lot younger than 40, and prejudice suffered by a 40-yearold is not typically owing to youth, as 40-year-olds sadly tend to
find out. The enemy of 40 is 30, not 50.26
The Court thus saw the forty-year age requirement as a way for Congress
to classify the group that was in danger of discrimination in favor of even
younger persons, not as a means of identifying a threat of "favoritism
toward seniors. 2 65 The Court further cited to the congressional testimony of
the stewardesses 266 that attempted to lower the age requirement for
protection under the statute, and the Court noted that even these employees
were worried about being discriminated against in favor of younger, rather
than older, workers.26 7
The Court also examined the plain meaning of the term "age. 2 68 The
Court noted that, on its face, the word "age" can have either of two different
meanings: (1) the length of time that an individual has lived, or (2) as a
form of "shorthand for the longer span and concurrent aches that make
youth look good., 269 The Court acknowledged that the ADEA contains a
defense for an employer where age is shown to be "'a bona fide
occupational qualification"' of the job. In this context, the word "age"
262. Id. at 590-91.
263. Id. at 591.

264. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6 (1967)); see Ennis, supra note 255, at 759-60
(discussing the Court's analysis and noting that it "couched its conclusion in terms of social
history").
265. Cline, 540 U.S. at 591-92.
266. Id. at 591; see supra text accompanying notes 192-95 (discussing the legislative
history of the ADEA and summarizing the testimony of the stewardesses).
267. Cline, 540 U.S. at 591. The Court also pointed to the near unanimity of opinion in the
federal courts that reverse discrimination is not viable under the ADEA. Id. at 593-94. This
unified opinion of the federal courts "is enough to rule out any serious claim of ambiguity." Id.
268. Id. at 594-98.
269. Id. at 596.
270. Id. at 595 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)). The defense states that it is not unlawful to
"take any action otherwise prohibited ... where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
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clearly means the number of years that an individual has lived.271 However,
the Court rejected the argument that this same meaning of the term must be
imported to the prohibition against discrimination "'because of [an]
individual's age.' "272 Rather, the Court concluded that the term "age" as
used in the statute's operative prohibitory language means "old age., 273 This
conclusion is supported by the "social history" of discrimination in our
society against relatively older workers as well as the legislative record.2 74
The Court also dismissed the statements in the congressional record by
Senator Yarborough suggesting that a reverse age discrimination claim
would be viable where he stated that "[t]he law prohibits age being a factor
in the decision to hire, as to one age over the other, whichever way [the]
decision went., 27 The Court considered this a "single outlying statement"
which should not be relied upon. 276 Finally, the Court indicated that it was
not persuaded by the fact that the EEOC had issued regulations suggesting
the viability of a reverse age discrimination claim.277 The Court found the
agency's interpretation of the statute to be "clearly wrong., 278 Thus, the
Supreme Court, relying on the "text, structure, purpose, and history" of the
statute, concluded that the ADEA does not prohibit "an employer from
favoring an older employee
over a younger one," and reversed the decision
27 9
Circuit.
Sixth
of the
Justice Scalia dissented from the opinion, arguing that deference should
have been afforded to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute, which he
believed was not "unreasonable., 28" Noting that the statute did not
unambiguously preclude a reverse discrimination claim, Justice Scalia
281
found it appropriate to "defer to the agency's authoritative conclusion.,
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a separate dissenting
opinion, noting that "[t]his should have been an easy case., 28 2 Justice
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
271. Cline, 540 U.S. at 596-97.
272. Id. at 595-96 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)(1)).
273. Id. at 596.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 598 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967)). The statement was in response to a
question from another senator asking whether it would be illegal to hire a forty-two-year-old
instead of a fifty-two-year-old employee based solely on the age of the younger worker. Id.
276. Cline, 540 U.S. at 598-99.
277. Id. at 599-600.
278. Id. at 600.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 602.
282. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas focused on the plain language of the statute, arguing that this
language required the conclusion that claims should be permitted "by the
relatively young when discriminated against in favor of the relatively
old. 283 Justice Thomas emphasized that the prohibition against
discriminating "because of such individual's age" was not limited to
"discrimination because of relatively older age." 284 In contrast to the
opinion of the majority, Justice Thomas emphasized that it is common use
of the term discrimination to mean that an employer terminated an
employee solely because the worker was under forty-five.285 Indeed, it
would be a "struggle" to find any other phrase to describe such an
employment action.286
Justice Thomas further noted the ambiguity of the word "age" in the
statute, and argued for a consistent application of the term throughout the
ADEA. 287 To maintain that the term "age" in the bona fide occupational
28 8
defense means "older age" would make this provision "incoherent.,
Because the term "age" in this defense must mean "chronological age,"
then, Justice Thomas maintained that the term should be similarly
interpreted in the statute's text prohibiting discrimination. 28 9 This consistent
application of the term age would therefore support the conclusion that
discrimination claims brought by relatively younger workers should be
permitted. 290 Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas also relied upon the
EEOC's interpretation of the statute, noting that "it strains credulity to
argue that such a reading is so unreasonable that an agency could not adopt
it."291

Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the majority's decision, which
"[s]trangely" failed to "explain why it departs" from the plain meaning of
the statutory text. 292 Justice Thomas was not persuaded that the Court should
examine the "social history" of the statute in the face of the ADEA's clear

283. Id. at 602-03; see Lacy, supra note 187, at 382 (discussing Justice Thomas's dissent
and noting the emphasis placed on the "unambiguous" statutory text).
284. Cline, 540 U.S. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).
285. Id.

286. Id.
287. Id. at 603-04;. see Ennis, supra note 255, at 761 (discussing Justice Thomas's use of
the word "age" in his dissent).
288. Cline, 540 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 603-05.
291. Id. at 606. Justice Thomas also pointed to the legislative record, and noted that the
only relevant portion supports his reading of the statute. Id. In this regard, Senator Yarborough
"confirmed that the text really meant what it said." Id.
292. Id.
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plain language.29 3 Justice Thomas therefore disagreed with the majority's

holding and reasoning, and would have upheld the decision of the Sixth
Circuit.294
3.

Lessons from Cline and the American Reaction

The Supreme Court's decision in Cline made clear that the age
protections of the anti-discrimination statutes were intended for older, rather
than younger, employees. The majority emphasized that there was
"nothing" in the congressional hearings indicating any concern that
295
employees were worried over "discrimination in favor of their seniors.,
The Court went out of its way to emphasize that American society favors a
"youth culture" where "younger is better," and that discrimination in this
country is obviously targeted "against the older."2' 96 At the same time, the
Court acknowledged that discrimination can occur against the young based
on an employer's stereotypical perceptions of "youthful . . . inexperience

and unsteadiness. 297 The Court further highlighted that the "social history"
of discrimination against relatively older workers supported its
conclusion.298
In limiting the claims that can be brought by relatively younger workers,
the Court simply ignored the plain meaning of the statutory text. The
majority instead read "social history" and American culture into the statute,
a result Justice Thomas warned will lead the Court "far astray from wellsettled principles of statutory interpretation., 299 At a minimum, then, the
Court's analysis can be said to be a strained reading of the ADEA. So what
was the reaction of younger workers in this country to this controversial
decision which explicitly limited their employment protections on the basis
of age? Similar to the reaction of American youth to the passage of the
ADEA-which gave employees under forty no protections from age
discrimination-the Supreme Court's decision to further restrict the rights
of younger workers did not cause any noticeable response among young
Americans. The news reports of the decision are simply devoid of any
293. Id. at 606-07. Justice Thomas notes that the majority did not explain the meaning of
"social history," though the term "is apparently something different from legislative history,
because the Court refers to legislative history as a separate interpretive tool in the very same
sentence." Id. at 607.
294. Id. at 613.
295. Id. at 589 (majority opinion).
296. Id. at 591.

297. Id.
298. Id. at 596.

299. Id. at 612 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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mention of outrage by younger workers.3°° This is true even though millions
of American workers are in the protected age group and were therefore
directly impacted by the decision.3"' And, through the passage of time, those
employees that are younger than forty will also be impacted by the decision
during the course of their careers.
This lack of concern by American youth over the further reduction of
employment protections based solely on age is startling when compared
with the French reaction to the Constitutional Council's decision. Presented
with an almost identical question of reverse age discrimination, France's
Constitutional Council ruled that it did not violate the French Constitution
to afford greater protections to older workers than younger employees. 0 2
Unlike the lack of reaction by American youth to the U.S. Supreme Court,
however, youth in France immediately took notice of the Constitutional
Council's decision, resulting in widespread protests.30 3 Continued protests in
the days following the French decision would result in the government
abandoning its youth employment law. 3°4 The failure to respond to the
Supreme Court's decision in the United States, however, meant that
American youth had accepted the additional erosion of their employment
rights while older Americans maintained their protections. Complacency
comes with a cost.
B. Smith v. City of Jackson: Limiting Age Protections
In Smith v. City of Jackson,3" 5 the Supreme Court continued to erode the

protections afforded to employees on the basis of age. Though not directly
focused on the rights of younger workers, the Court's recent decision has
implications for all workers alleging age discrimination. In Smith, the Court
300. See, e.g., Stephen Henderson, Older Workers May Have Extra Benefits, Court Says,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 25, 2004, at A2 (discussing implications of Cline and noting that pension
and benefits packages that "draw age distinctions" are not actionable under the Court's
reasoning); Tom Ramstack, Better Benefits for Older Workers Upheld: Court Says Age-Bias
Laws Not Meant for Young, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at C8 (discussing the Court's decision
and noting that younger employees are not protected); Court Halts Age-Bias Case: Younger
Workers Cannot Sue if Older Colleagues Receive Better Treatment, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2004, at Cl (noting that under the Court's decision "[a]ge has its benefits").
301. See, e.g., Ramstack, supra note 300, at C8 (noting that roughly half of the American
work force is forty or older - approximately seventy million employees).
302. See supra Part III (discussing the Constitutional Council's decision upholding
constitutionality of youth employment law).
303. Smith, supra note 13.
304. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing French government reaction to
student protests).
305. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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considered whether workers covered by the ADEA could bring a claim of
disparate-impact (or unintentional) discrimination.306 The plaintiffs,
employees of a city police department, maintained that their employer's pay
scale had a discriminatory impact against older workers because younger
police officers received higher percentage salary increases than older
Court was whether plaintiffs could
officers. 3 7 Thus, the question before30the
8
even bring a disparate-impact claim.
Prior to the Court's decision, the appellate courts were split on the issue
of whether an unintentional discrimination claim was even viable under the
ADEA. °9 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, concluded that disparateimpact claims on the basis of age can be properly brought under the
statute.310 In reaching this conclusion, the plurality pointed out that the
language of the ADEA mirrors the language of Title VII authorizing
disparate-impact litigation.3" In this regard, it is illegal for an employer to
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees" on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex . . . national origin," or "age. 312 Because the two statutes

contain this same language,313 then, they should be interpreted consistently
to recognize disparate-impact claims.3" 4
The Court further considered whether the provision in the ADEA that
makes it lawful for an employer to take an "otherwise prohibited"
employment action "where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age discrimination" (RFOA) prohibits disparate-impact claims
under this statute.315 The plurality concluded that the RFOA defense was
306. Id. at 230.
307. Id.at 231.
308. Id.at 230.
309. Id.at 237 n.9 (summarizing circuit split).
310. Id.at 232.
311. Id.at 233. The Supreme Court recognized disparate impact as a viable theory of
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v.Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
312. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. Id.at 233-34.
314. Id.at 236 ("Griggs, which interpreted the identical text at issue here, thus strongly
suggests that a disparate-impact theory should be cognizable under the ADEA."). The Court
was similarly persuaded that the legislative history supported the conclusion that disparateimpact theory is viable under the statute. Id.at 232.
315. Id.at 238 (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90202, § 4, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(f). "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization- (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonablefactors other than
age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (emphasis added).
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consistent with disparate-impact theory because "the RFOA provision plays
its principal role [in unintentional discrimination cases] by precluding
liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that was
'reasonable.' 3,1 6 Thus, Congress' inclusion of this defense into the statute
"actually supports" the conclusion that it intended disparate-impact claims
to be viable under the ADEA.317 The plurality also looked to the regulations
of the Department of Labor and EEOC, both of which "consistently
interpreted" the statute to permit disparate-impact claims. 3 8 Based on the
statutory text, legislative history, and agency interpretations, the Court
concluded that disparate-impact claims should be permitted in cases of age
discrimination.319
Though seemingly an employee-friendly decision on its face, the Court
did not end with this analysis and continued its opinion by exploring the
reasons why disparate-impact claims under the ADEA are "narrower than
under Title VII," pointing specifically to the RFOA provision.320 The Court
concluded that unlike disparate-impact analysis under Title VII, the
"reasonableness inquiry" under the ADEA does not require a determination
of whether there are other ways to achieve the employer's goals that have
" ' Rather, any factor that an employer
less impact on the protected group.32
uses to achieve its business goals is acceptable as long as it is "reasonable"
and not based on age.322 Turning to the specific facts of the case, the Court
examined the city's stated justification for giving younger workers larger
percentage pay increases than older workers-the city's desire to make less
senior officers' salaries competitive with other positions in the relevant
labor market. 323 The Court found this justification "unquestionably
reasonable," and therefore rejected the plaintiffs' claims.324
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia supported the Court's judgment,
but instead emphasized that he would defer to the EEOC's interpretation of

316. Smith, 544 U.S. at 239.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 239-40 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(i) (1970) and 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7
(2004)).
319. Id. at 232-33, 240; see Michael Selmi, Was the DisparateImpact Theory a Mistake?,
53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 748 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court recognized disparate-impact
theory under the ADEA in Smith).
320. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
321. Id.at 243.
322. See id. at 242.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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the statute, which permits disparate-impact claims.2 5 Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred in the Court's decision
rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, but only on the grounds that disparate
impact should not be recognized as a viable theory under the ADEA.326
Justice O'Connor further noted that while she disagreed with the
recognition of disparate-impact claims under the ADEA, these claims,3 if27
allowed, should be "strictly circumscribed by the RFOA exemption.
Therefore, where the employer has asserted a factor "rationally related to
it should escape liability for a
some legitimate business objective,"
3 28
disparate-impact ADEA claim.
Thus, while the Supreme Court recognized the existence of disparateimpact claims under the ADEA, the Court was clear that such claims are
extremely limited.3 29 Even if plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that an
employer's policy results in a disparate impact on the basis of age, the
policy will still be upheld if it was implemented for a "reasonable"
rationale 3 3 or is "rationally related to some legitimate business
objective. 33 ' It would certainly not be difficult for an employer to identify
some rationale to justify a discriminatory policy that would meet this
extremely low threshold. Indeed, most employment decisions-whether
discriminatory or not-can be justified by monetary concerns.
Despite the effect this decision will have limiting the potential relief for
all victims of age discrimination, the Smith decision also failed to generate
any significant controversy in the United States. The limited press coverage
of the decision tended to emphasize that workers will have greater, rather
than reduced, protections under the ADEA.3 32 These articles focus primarily

325. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:
The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1948 n.70 (2006) (discussing
the plurality's limited consideration of deference to the EEOC's argument in Smith).
326. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 247-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 267.
328. Id.
329. See Charles A. Sullivan, DisparateImpact: Looking past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 974 n.260 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's limitation of
disparate-impact claims on the basis of age under Smith).
330. Smith, 544 U.S. at 242-43.
331. Id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
332. See, e.g., Charles Lane, What's Goodfor Gosling Isn't Always Goodfor Gander, Top
Court Says, PITrSBURGH TRIB. REV., Mar. 31, 2005 (noting that the "Supreme Court made it
easier to sue for age discrimination" but that such claims "should be more limited than racialdiscrimination lawsuits"); David G. Savage, Justices Give Older Workers More Leeway in
Alleging Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 1 (stating that the Court "gave workers age 40 and
older greater rights to sue an employer for age discrimination, even if there was no evidence that
such bias was intentional" and noting the employer defense); Hope Yen, Ruling Supports Older
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on the Supreme Court's recognition of disparate impact as an available
theory under the ADEA, only secondarily noting that the employer will
almost always have an iron-clad defense to these actions. 33 Again, like the
failure of the youth of this country to react to the Supreme Court's decision
in Cline,33 4 employees of all ages have remained seemingly indifferent to
the reduction of their employment protections. Ambivalence as to the level
of protections afforded to age discrimination in the United States continues
to persist.
C. Other Protectionsfor Younger Workers

Though the ADEA and the Supreme Court have done little, if anything,
to provide protections to the younger employees in the American
workforce, it is worth briefly noting that other protections sometimes exist.
In this regard, while most states have adopted language similar to the
ADEA, New Jersey has enacted a statute permitting discrimination claims
brought by younger workers. 335 The state's law broadly provides that "[a]ll
persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment . . . without

discrimination because of . . . age., 336 Because the law does not restrict
discrimination claims on the basis of a particular age, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as permitting discrimination
claims "based on youth.,

3 37

Thus, at least one state has taken action to

prohibit the overt discrimination against youth based solely on their age,338
Workers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2005, at IC (stating that the Court's decision "expanded job
protections for roughly half the nation's workforce" and also noting employer defense).
333. See sources cited supra note 332.
334. See supra Part VI.A.3 (discussing reaction of American youth to the Supreme Court's
decision in Cline).
335. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2006); see Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination
Law Affect the Imposition of a Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National
Basketball Association?, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 603-05 (2001) (discussing New
Jersey's broad prohibition on age discrimination and how it differs from the great majority of
other state laws on age discrimination); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a)-(e) (West 2006)
(restricting additional employment decisions from being made on the basis of age).
336. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.
337. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 957 (N.J. 1999) ("We hold that the
[statute's] prohibition against age discrimination is broad enough to accommodate [plaintiffs]
claim of age discrimination based on youth .... Because the [statute] contains no such express
[age] limitation, our decision rests on our independent assessment of the language and purpose
of [the act]."); see Fuhrman, supra note 335, at 604-05 (discussing the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in Sisler).
338. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 957 (permitting younger workers to bring age discrimination
claims). See generally Employment Discrimination-Youth-BasedTermination-an Employee
Age Discrimination Claim Based on Youth Is Cognizable Under the New Jersey Law Against

38:1053]

UNDERSTANDING FRANCE'S UNREST

1099

and certain other states have acted to recognize "reverse age discrimination
claims between members of the respective protected classes., 339 However,
despite being afforded some protections in individual states, youth have not
enjoyed consistent protections at the state level. 340 And, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the ADEA in Cline to prohibit reverse age
discrimination claims may ultimately have a negative impact on the way the
state courts view the age protections given to younger workersparticularly where the state statute involves language similar to the ADEA.
Additionally, younger workers might be able to pursue reverse age
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.341 Under the Equal Protection Clause,
persons that are "similarly situated will be dealt with in a similar manner"
through the requirement that "government classifications [must] relate to
proper governmental purposes., 342 Though age discrimination claims
brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause appear to have significant
potential, such claims have not been well received by the Supreme Court,343

which does not view age as a suspect classification. 344 Additionally, any
Discrimination and Appropriately Evaluated Under a Heightened Reverse-Discrimination
Standard-Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 723 A.2d 944 (1999), Surveys of
Recent Developments in New Jersey Law, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 682 (2000) (discussing the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Sisler).
339. Megan Jordan Strickland, Note, The Impact of Interpretation:The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act as Determined by the Sixth Circuit, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 197, 208-09
(2003); see also Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Cole, J., concurring) (discussing state law protections for younger workers), rev'd, 540 U.S.
581 (2004).
340. See Fuhrman, supra note 335, at 605 (noting that there has been "no advance" of youth
age protections in other states that is "as significant as New Jersey's," but noting that California
may have opened the door to possible reverse discrimination claims); Strickland, supra note
339, at 208 (noting that the success of reverse age discrimination claims is limited to "a few
select states").
341. See Fuhrman, supra note 335, at 606-09 (discussing use of the Equal Protection
Clause in attacking reverse age discrimination); Barry Bennett Kaufman, Note, Preferential
Hiring Policiesfor Older Workers Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 825, 849 (1983) ("[T]he equal protection clause [sic] of the fourteenth amendment
[sic] has served as the primary device for constitutional attacks on age discrimination."); see
also LARSON, supra note 189, § 120.03, at 120-9 (noting that prior to the passage of the ADEA,
claims of age bias were pursued primarily through "constitutional attacks").
342. Kaufman, supra note 341.
343. Id. at 853 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has recognized that the use of age to differentiate
between groups of people will often be 'reasonable,' and that the reasonableness of such
classifications ordinarily will suffice to sustain them against an equal protection challenge.").
But see Fuhrman, supra note 335, at 608-09 (discussing a successful equal protection age
discrimination claim in a federal district court case).
344. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) ("[A]ge is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause."). Unlike age, the Court has determined that
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equal protection challenges would be limited to cases involving
governmental actors, such as claims brought against public employers.345
Similar to the French Constitutional Council's rejection of a constitutional
challenge to the validity of the employment law favoring older workers,
then, plaintiffs have also had limited success pursuing age claims under the
Constitution of the United States.34 6

Thus, younger employees may have some additional protections from
age discrimination under state law and the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Such protections appear extremely limited, however, and
do not provide younger workers with any widespread relief.
VII.

UNDERSTANDING THE LACK OF REACTION OF AMERICAN YOUTH

The past four decades have seen the enactment of legislation granting
significantly greater protections to older workers in the United States. The
Supreme Court has also acted to restrict the protections available to younger
workers. The youth of this country have allowed this legislation and these
decisions to go unchallenged. When juxtaposed against the hostile reaction
in France to a similar law limiting the rights of younger workers,347 the

failure of youth to act in this country shows signs of complacency on the
part of these Americans. Indeed, the First Job Contract in France-which
only limited the rights of workers twenty-six and younger3-had an
arguably less dramatic impact on the rights of younger workers than the
ADEA, 49 which afforded protections only to Americans age forty and
older. Is the explanation for the disparate reaction to these laws that the
youth of this country agree with Justice Souter that American society values
a "youth culture," perceiving that "younger is better,"3 ° and are therefore
more willing to accept greater protections being given to older workers who
arguably need them more? Do younger Americans agree that older workers
race is a suspect classification. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228
(1995) ("By requiring strict scrutiny of racial classifications, we require courts to make sure that
a governmental classification based on race . . . is legitimate, before permitting unequal
treatment based on race to proceed.").
345. Fuhrman, supra note 335, at 606-08 (discussing "government action" requirement of
the Equal Protection Clause).
346. See supra Part III (discussing the French Constitutional Council's analysis of the First
Job Contract).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 4-18 (discussing French youth reaction to the First
Job Contract).
348. See Moore, supra note 6.
349. See supra Part V.B (discussing passage and protections of the ADEA).
350. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004).
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because they suffer from "concurrent
are entitled to additional protections
' 3 51
good?
look
youth
make
aches that
The question of why younger Americans more idly accept legislation and
Court decisions restricting their rights than their French counterparts can
obviously be debated. I believe, however, that there are three primary
differences between American society and French society that account for
these different reactions. More specifically: (1) younger Americans have not
suffered from the persistently high unemployment rates endured by French
youth, (2) younger Americans do not have an active collective voice like
their French counterparts, and (3) American youth do not have the history
of success in protesting governmental action that encourages dissent like the
French youth. I will examine each of these considerations in turn.
A. Unemployment Rate
As previously discussed, French youth have suffered from an extremely
high unemployment rate for decades.352 Unemployment of men aged fifteen
to twenty-four stood at 22.1% in 1984, and was 30.2% for women in the
same age category.353 Despite the government's repeated efforts to address
this problem over the years, 354 the unemployment rate among French youth
is still around 22%.
American youth have been much more fortunate, however, and have
remained employed in far greater numbers over the past few decades. For
example, in June 1974, young American adults between the ages of twenty
and twenty-four had an unemployment rate of only 9.3%.356 In 2005, the
American unemployment rate for young adults in the same age group stood
even lower at 8.8%.157 Thus, in recent years, young Americans have

351. Id. at 596.
352. See supra Part IV (discussing high unemployment among French youth and
governmental reaction).
353. DESPAX & ROJOT, supra note 40, at 29 tbl.9.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26 (discussing specific governmental action
taken to alleviate French unemployment among younger workers).
355. Galloni, supra note 19.
356. LARSON, supra note 189, § 120.02, at 120-6 (citing Bureau of Labor statistics). The
national unemployment rate average in June, 1974 was 4.9%. Id. at 120-5.
357. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE
CIVILIAN

NONINSTITUTIONAL

POPULATION

BY

AGE,

SEX,

AND

RACE,

http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat3.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). The average national
unemployment rate in 2005 in the United States for persons sixteen and older was 5.1%. Id. See
generally Robert Kaestner, The Effect of Government-MandatedBenefits on Youth Employment,
50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 122 (1996) (discussing the effect of government-mandated
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experienced an unemployment rate that is approximately only one-half of
the unemployment rate of their French counterparts.3 58 The consistently
lower unemployment rate for younger Americans inherently provides a
better social climate for this group of workers. As American youth have not
had the same difficulty breaking into the labor market as employees in
France, there is not the same level of general frustration and resentment
against older generations. Indeed, younger workers in France must watch
helplessly as their elders reap the many benefits of employment in the
country-including guaranteed pensions, short work days, and protections
against discipline and discharge.35 9 Such persistent unemployment can have
both a negative psychological and physical effect on these individuals.360
American youth, while enjoying a relatively low unemployment rate,
also benefit from certain advantages in the American labor market as
compared to older workers. In this regard, while younger Americans are
unemployed at a higher rate than older Americans, they also remain
unemployed for a shorter period of time.36' For example, young adults
between the ages of twenty and twenty-four remain unemployed for an
average of fifteen weeks, while those between the ages of forty-five and
fifty-four are unemployed for an average of twenty-five weeks.3 6' Due to the
longer period of time that it takes to find another job, then, unemployment
has a more significant financial impact on older individuals in the United
States.363 Cognizant of this fact, American youth are less likely to become
frustrated or envious of older workers when they find themselves out of a
job.
In addition to having an easier time finding employment than their
French counterparts, young Americans also enjoy an economic system that
is far wealthier than the one in France.3 64 France's per capita gross domestic
employer-provided benefits on the rate of employment among young adults in the United
States).
358. See David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages, Labor Market Institutions,
and Youth Employment: A Cross-NationalAnalysis, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 223, 230 tbl.2
(2004).
359. See supra Part II (discussing structure of French workforce, employment laws and
benefits).
360. Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and
Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 363, 398-99 (2002).
361. LARSON, supra note 189, § 120.02, at 120-7.
362. Id. at 120-6 n.3 (citing September 2003 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
363. Id. at 120-7. The difficulty older workers have finding other employment arises from a
variety of different reasons, including that "the older worker is less able to change either locality
or line of work, and in addition may encounter outright age discrimination in many
occupations." Id.
364. See Fisher & Lenglart, supra note 45, at 186-87 (comparing the economies of the
United States and France).
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product is approximately 50% lower than that of the United States.365 This
overall culture of wealth in the United States provides both additional
employment opportunities and a sense of security to younger Americans.36 6
And, those youth that are unemployed in the United States are far more
likely to be able to tap into the country's wealth by relying upon assistance
from older generations while they seek other jobs.
In sum, the consistently high unemployment rate among youth in France
leads to a simmering of frustrations in that country that predictably comes
to a boil when younger workers perceive that the government is attempting
to strip them of additional rights on the basis of their age. American youth,
however, enjoy far lower unemployment and a society with more significant
economic resources, making young Americans less likely to become
concerned when the courts or legislature act to take away age-based
protections.
B. Lack of a Unified Voice
Another significant difference between the two countries is that the labor
unions in France are far more powerful than they are in the United States.3 67
Indeed, in France, where the right to unionize is guaranteed by the
constitution, 368 "unions often negotiate terms of employment for entire
companies or even industries. 369 In the United States, union power has
dwindled in recent years. Union membership fell from almost 35% of
American workers in 1954 to 16% by 1991. 370 Census data reveals that
current union membership has fallen even further, and at present only 13%
of wage and salary employees-or about 15.8 million workers-have
joined a union in the United States.371 And, while a greater percentage of

365. Id. at 186.
366. Indeed, the fact that "the United States has considerably fewer legal restrictions on
corporations than does France" may also create flexibility in the labor market enabling
American companies to hire younger workers. Id. at 187.
367. See supra Part II.A (discussing the significant role of union membership in the French
labor market).
368. See DICKSON, supra note 32, at 189 (discussing constitutional right to unionize);
LEFEBVRE, supra note 38, at 357-59 (discussing employee union rights under French labor
law).
369. Union Power Redux, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 26, 2006; see also INT'L LABOR
LAW COMM., supra note 32, at 3-26.
370. Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1819 n.2
(1992).
371. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Facts for Features (Aug. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2004/cb04-ffl 3-02.pdf.
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American workers actually belong to unions than French employees,372 the
373
American unions do not appear to be as powerful as those in France,
which often negotiate collective bargaining agreements for non-union
members. 374 Indeed, it has been estimated that the French government
extends union and employer agreements to approximately 90% of
employees in the country.375 And, as demonstrated by the recent riots,
French youth themselves enjoy representation by powerful student
unions.37 6

Thus, unlike their French counterparts, American youth do not have a
readily available nationally recognized collective voice for expressing their
concern over pressing issues. The lack of a student-based union
infrastructure-or a national union willing to come to the aid of youthmakes it difficult for American students to quickly organize in response to
governmental action. And, without any powerful unions backing American
youth, there are no leaders to go before congressional representatives to
express their concerns over proposed legislation. For example, when it
passed the ADEA, Congress acknowledged that while it was sympathetic to
younger employees, the "only reason" it did not identify younger workers
for protection was that it feared a lower age limit would undermine the
"major objective of the bill. 377 No union activists attempted to change the
bill's "major objective," however, to target discrimination against all
workers on the basis of age. The lack of a unified student voice would thus
assure that the statute's protections were only afforded to older workers.
The lack of a collective voice for young Americans is likely derived
from the cultural sense of individuality idealized in this country.3 78 This

372. See Union Power Redux, supra note 369 ("[T]he United States surprisingly has a
higher ratio of union membership in its labor force than France.").
373. See Fuller, supra note 145 ("Unions in France appear to wield greater power than their
numerical strength, labor specialists say, because they receive widespread attention in the
French media, and the small minority of unionized workers, mainly in the public sector, strike
relatively often.").
374. DICKSON, supra note 32, at 190-91 (discussing the power of unions in the French
workplace).
375. Fuller, supra note 145 (discussing the power of unions in France). Interestingly, the
relative power of French unions is also an inherent weakness. Because unions are able to
negotiate agreements on behalf of non-union members, there becomes less incentive for French
workers to become unionized. Id.
376. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 19 (noting that student unions urged their membership to
"stick to plans for protest marches in Paris"); Smith, supra note 14 (discussing demands of
student and union leaders that labor law be withdrawn).
377. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 7 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
378. See, e.g., Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of the
Judiciary's Interpretationof the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 771, 813-14 (1994). "[I]f
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need for individuality in the United States has been explained by America's
relatively "scattered population," the security from foreign enemies derived
from the country's geographically isolated location, and the value placed on
individual acts when the American frontier was originally settled. 37 9 For
these reasons, Americans come together only "for specific purposes rather
than for general unity. ' 380 In contrast to America's sense of individuality,
' 38
France has more of a "prevailing social-democratic political ideology '
that emphasizes "social cohesion" over individual expression.382 Though the
social structure in France favors a group dynamic-as opposed to the
individuality favored in the United States-young Americans must still
realize the benefits of acting together through a unified voice if they want
their opinions heard.
The American youths' inability to find a collective voice is further
demonstrated by its lack of representation at the voting booth. For example,
during the last presidential election in 2004, almost 52% of eighteen to
twenty-four year olds voted, compared with the national average of
approximately 60%.383 This number of younger voters was actually
dramatically higher than during the 2000 presidential elections, when only
42% of youth voted.3 84 Some maintain that this low turnout "reveals
significant apathy" among youth "with [America's] current political
system., 385 It may indeed be that "many young people do not feel that their
viewpoints are considered, let alone adequately represented. 386 Regardless,
by failing to assure that their voice is heard on a national level, young
Americans subject themselves to the legislative agenda of older
generations.3 87 And while wisdom often comes with age, younger
one were limited to a single word with which to characterize America, one would choose the
word 'individualism."' RALPH BARTON PERRY, CHARACTERISTICALLY AMERICAN 8 (1949).
379. Apfel, supra note 378, at 814.
380. Id.
381. INT'L LABOR LAW COMM., supra note 32; see also Vivant, supra note 35, at 9 ("France
has developed an abundant and complex set of laws for the protection of the employee, making
France the 'social laboratory' of Europe.").
382. See Patrick R. Hugg, Transnational Convergence: European Union and American
Federalism, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43, 51-52 (1998) (discussing the role of community and
"social cohesion" in the European Union).
383. Elizabeth Aloi, Note, Thirty-Five Years After the 26th Amendment and Still
Disenfranchised: Current Controversies in Student Voting, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 283, 283

(2005).
384. Id.
385. Sean T. McLaughlin, Note, Pledge Our Grievance to the Flag: Could McCainFeingold Also Help Bring Young People Back to Politics?, 27 J.LEGIS. 493, 496 (2001).
386. Id.
387. See id. at 493-500 (discussing how lack of resources among youth results in
campaigns that do not address the interests of this voting bloc).
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Americans cannot be certain that their rights are being adequately protected
by older Americans without representation of their own.
C. No History of Successful Protests
France has a long history of successful protests in its country. The
French propensity towards conflict may be the result of the historical
development of the country, where industrialization progressed very

slowly.388 Interestingly, where in the United States union participants
consider their colleagues to be "members," in France unionists refer to one
another as "comrades"--derived from Latin meaning "soldier."38 9 French
workers have often resisted "consensus" and have "tended to put conflict
before co-operation. "'390 As discussed earlier, each generation of French
youth has seen its share of protests over the relevant issues of the day.39'
Seemingly without fail, the French government has backed down in each
instance.3 92 This has served only to encourage further protesting by the
French youth.
In the recent history of the United States, however, there is simply no
similar pattern of youth protests-whether successful or unsuccessful. This
is true, even though as Chief Justice Earl Warren once correctly observed,
the United States was "born in protest."3' 93 One would likely have to go back
to the Civil Rights era or the Vietnam War to find examples of student
protests on a national level that effectuated any significant change in U.S.
policy.3 94 Indeed, the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s saw the rise of
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a student group that
"began the interracial brigades of non-violent civil rights workers that
388. DICKSON, supra note 32, at 189.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48 (discussing various protests engaged in by
French youth over the years).
392. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48 (discussing response of government to the
protests of French youth).
393. Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal
Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 97 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
394. See id. (discussing student war protests); Sheryll D. Cashin, The Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Coalition Politics, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1029, 1040 (2005) (discussing student
involvement in civil rights protests); Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the
First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 78 (1990) (discussing "widespread" protests that
occurred during the Vietnam war); Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The CourtMartial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 839, 847 (1994) ("The first nationwide
demonstration against the war, organized by Students for a Democratic Society, drew 25,000
protesters to Washington, D.C., on April 17, 1965. Antiwar teach-ins, beginning at the
University of Michigan and spreading to other campuses, also marked that spring.").
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organized Freedom Summer and the Freedom rides., 395 And, the wellpublicized and influential protests of American youth during Vietnam even
found their way before the Supreme Court, which held that the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected the right of students to wear
black armbands as a signal of their disapproval of the war.396 Perhaps the
most notable example of American student opposition of that era is also the
most tragic-when four individuals were killed and nine others injured in
May 1970, at Kent State University during hostile protests of the proposed
U.S. invasion of Cambodia-underscoring the inherent dangers involved in
violent rioting.3 97
The student activism of the 1960s and early 1970s has waned in recent
years, and there are no notable examples of nationwide protest on the part
of American youth in the past two decades that resulted in any significant
change in governmental policies. Through the passage of time, then,
younger Americans have become more ambivalent towards governmental
action and have not cultivated a tradition of conflict similar to their French
counterparts. The effect of this passivity is two-fold: (1) younger Americans
have not witnessed their predecessors engage in any collective opposition,
and the younger generation is therefore not emboldened to act in protest;
and (2) the government is not as afraid to pursue policies that might
negatively impact upon younger individuals, as the government knows that
this group does not have the political clout to oppose its actions.
There is no ready explanation for the decline in student protests that were
so clearly visible during past American generations. Perhaps there have
been no significant events in recent years warranting the intervention of
young Americans. It may instead be that the unfortunate events at Kent
State University created a sense of fear in younger Americans, that has
persisted to this day, to protest any governmental action. Or, perhaps there
is a sense of apathy generated by the belief of young Americans that their

395. Cashin, supra note 394, at 1040; see also STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET
SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARIN LUTHER KING, JR. 155 (1982) ("[T]he Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee . . .[was designed] to orchestrate the sit-ins and mobilize students
across America to combat segregation through nonviolent protest.").
396. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
397. See Julie A. Brenizer Klosterman, Tribute to Judge Don J. Young, 28 U. TOL. L. REV.
355, 362-63 (1997). Students at Kent State protested President Nixon's announcement that the
United States would invade Cambodia Id. at 362. The student protests were marked by "mob
rule" and looting, and the National Guard was sent to restore order. Id. When guardsmen fired
shots into the crowd, four persons were killed and nine others wounded. Id. at 363; see also
Gregory D. Keeney, Comment, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1022 n.88 (1971) (discussing the level of student protests
before and after the Kent State incident).
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' Regardless of the reason, it is
views are not "adequately represented."398
clear that the youth of America do not have the same incentive to oppose
governmental action as the youth in France, who routinely witness the

government back down to student demands.3 99

VIII.

LESSONS FROM FRANCE

Simply because there are differences in the French and American
cultures that explain the disparate reactions to legislation and court
decisions restricting the rights of younger workers does not mean that
American youth cannot learn from the experience of their French
counterparts. Knowledge is power, and younger Americans have observed
from afar as the youth of France have been able to effectuate change
beneficial to their interests by acting through a collective voice. We
obviously should not condone the hostile and violent behavior engaged in
by many French youth to protest legislation and court decisions. And, such
aggressive acts are often counterproductive to the attempts of youth to
convey their message. However, the ability of young French workers to act
through a single collective voice, and to take notice when governmental
action threatens their rights, are traits that should be valued by youth in the
United States.
Peaceful protesting, active lobbying, union organizing, and increased
voting are all viable ways for American youth to protect their interests, both
in the employment arena and elsewhere. Though there are many ways for
young Americans to protect their rights, one basic principle has proven
essential in France and should be adopted in the United States as wellAmerican youth must find a collective voice. And this voice must be heard
on a national level.

398. McLaughlin, supra note 385, at 496.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48 (discussing student protests in France and
governmental reaction). It is also worth noting that the so-called "endowment effect," whereby
individuals "tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not," may play a
role in the disparate reactions of French and American youth. James Robert Ward, III, The
Endowment Effect and the EmpiricalCasefor Changing the Default Employment Contractfrom
Termination "At-Will" to "For-Cause"Discharge, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 205, 209 (2004)
(quoting Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227,

1228 (2003)). In this regard, the French youth were stripped of their employment protections by
the First Job Contract, while American youth never had those protections to begin with.
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IX. CONCLUSION

The reaction of French youth to a recently proposed labor law restricting
their employment rights and the French Constitutional Council's decision
upholding the law stands in direct contrast to the reaction of American
youth to similar legislation and Supreme Court decisions. The disparate
reaction can likely be explained by the difference in unemployment rates of
the two countries, the ability of French youth to rally quickly around a
unified voice, and the history of successful student protests in France which
are nonexistent in the United States.
Perhaps youth in France are the "throwaway" or "Kleenex generation."
The young workers of that country may have even acted unreasonably in
opposing the First Job Contract-which was designed for their benefit. The
one certain thing, however, is that French youth will not sit idly by while
their employment protections are taken away. There is definitely a
propensity of the French youth to go too far in protesting governmental
action, and violent acts and unlawful resistance are never the answer when
opposing legislation. Americans, however, should take note of the ability of
French youth to be cognizant of relevant legislation and court decisions, as
well as the French capacity to quickly organize in opposition to
governmental action that they perceive to have a negative impact on their
rights. As Thomas Jefferson observed, "[t]he Spirit of Resistance to
Government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always
kept alive. ' '4 ° The alternative to finding its collective voice is that American
youth will continue to watch as their employment protections are gradually
eroded. This truly is the price of American ambivalence.

400. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 895 (1996) (citation omitted).

